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TUNISIA'S CLAIMS OVER ADJACENT SEAS AND
THE DOCTRINE OF "HISTORIC RIGHTS"*
Andrea Gioia**

I. INTRODUCTION

The existence of "historic rights" along the Tunisian coasts has
long been emphasized by legal writers• and has been one of the central issues in the dispute between Tunisia and Libya over the
delimitation of their respective continental shelves.2 The 1982 judgment of the International Court of Justice regarding the delimitation of the Tunisian and Libyan continental shelves, however, did
not clarify the nature, or the extent, of Tunisia's "historic rights,"
because an investigation of this kind was not deemed indispensable
for a decision to be reached. 8 It seems, therefore, worthwhile to
examine recent Tunisian practice relating to the delimitation of
maritime areas in order to ascertain whether, and to what extent,
• This article has been written in conjunction with a research project sponsored
by the Italian Ministry of Public Education.
•• Doctoral candidate in International Law, University of Pisa, Italy.
1. See generally, G. GIDEL, l LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER. LE TEMPS DE
PAIX 491-93 (1932); G. GIDEL, 3 LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER, LE TEMPS DE PAIX
663 (1934); Fran~ois, Deuxieme Rapport sur la Haute Mer, [1951) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 97,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/42/1951; M. STROHL. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 263 (1963); L.J.
BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-22 (1964); F. LAURIA. IL REGIME
GIURIDICO DELLE BAIE E DEi GOLFI 171 (1970); Barrie, Historical Bays, 6 COMP. & INT'L L.J.
S. AFRICA 39, 53 (1973); F. MOUSSA, LA TUNISIE ET LE DROIT DE LA MER 25-29 (1981).
2. Memorial of Tunisia (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings (1
Continental Shelf) 31, 57-58, 73-111 (Memorial dated May 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Tunisian Memorial]: Memorial of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Continental Shelf) 455 (Memorial dated May 30, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Libyan Memorial]. See Counter Memorial of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1980 l.C.J. Pleadings (II Continental Shelf) 41-73 (Counter
Memorial dated Dec. l, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Libyan Counter Memorial]: Reply of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings (IV Continental Shelf) 14-25 (Reply dated July 15, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Libyan Reply); Reply
of Tunisia (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1980 l.C.J. Pleadings (IV Continental Shelf)
21-29 (Reply dated July 15, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Tunisian Reply].
3. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 71-77 (Judgment of Feb. 24). See Queneduc, Note sur L 'arret de la Gour Internationale de Justice Relatif
a la Delimitation du Plateau Continental Entre la Tunisie et la Libye, 27 ANNUAIRE
FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [AN. FR. DR. INT.] 203 (1981); Zoller, Recherehe sur les
Methodes de Delimitation du Plateau Continental: A Propos de l'Affaire Tunisie - Libye, 86
REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G. DR.INT.P.J 645 (1982); Feldman, The
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Tunisia's claims can be justified on the basis of any "historic rights"
that might exist. An assessment of the actual relevance of Tunisia's "historic rights" should prove particularly interesting in light
of the extensive changes undergone by the Law of the Sea in recent years. Although this paper does not purport to discuss the complex ·theoretical problems raised by the vindication of "historic
rights" within the ambit of the International Community,' a brief
definition of some of the terms involved seems to be unavoidable.
First, the term "historic rights" shall be used to indicate those
rights which a state has acquired vis-0-vis one or more other states
by effectively exercising those rights, with the acquiescence of the
state or states concerned. 5 In other words, this expression will be
used to indicate those special rights acquired by a state in derogation to the existing general rules which would otherwise apply to
the situation at hand.
In addition, when referring to the Law of the Sea, it is best
to distinguish between kinds of "historic rights" according to their
content; that is to say, according to the extent of the imperium due
to the state which has acquired the right in question. On the one
hand, state practice shows that a state may acquire full sovereignty
over bodies of water adjacent to its coasts which, according to the
existing general rules, would be beyond the limits of its maritime
domain. This situation is covered by the doctrine of "historic
waters," 6 one aspect of which is represented by the theory of
Tunisia - Libya Continental Shelf Case: Geographi,c Justi,ce or Judi,cial Compromise?, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 219 (1983); Rodriguez, La Sentencia del Tribunal Internacional de Justicia, de 24 de
Febrero de 1982, en el Asunto Relativo a la Plataforma Continental Entre Tuenz y la Ja.mahiriya
Arabe Libia, 35 REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL [R.EsP.DER.INT.]
4. With special reference to "historic bays," see Goldie, Histori,c Bays in International
Law: An Impressionistic Overview, 11 SYR J. INT'L L. & CoM. 211 (1984).
5. This definition is borrowed from Sperduti, Sul Regime Giuridico dei Mari, 43
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [RIV. DIR. INT.] 58, 72 (1960) See also Y.Z. BLUM, HISTORIC
TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1965).
On international acquiescence see MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International
Law, 31 BRIT. Y .B. INT'L L. 143 (1954); MacGibbon, Customary International Law and
Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.115; Sperduti, Prescrizione, Consuetudine e Acquiescenza
in Diritto Internazionale, 44 Riv. DIR. INT. 3 (1961); Mosconi, La Dottrina dell 'Estoppel in Diritto
Internazionale, 16 DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [DIR.INT.] 388 (1962).
6. In the Fisheries Case, the International Court of Justice gave the following definition of "historic waters:" "By 'historic waters' are usually meant waters which are treated
as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence
of an historic title." Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951I.C.J.132 (Judgment of Dec. 18). According to L.J. BouCHEZ, supra note l, at 281, "(h]istoric waters are waters over which the coastal
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"historic bays."7 On the other hand, the general category of "historic
rights" also covers those special rights a state may acquire, in
derogation of existing general rules relating to the exercise of a
limited authority over certain portions of the high seas, without
at the same time involving a claim of full sovereignty. One example of this type of "historic rights" is that of historic fishing rights
which a state might have acquired in particular areas of the high
seas. 8
If one accepts this definition of terms, it follows that our
investigation should be carried out by examining separately, on the
one hand, Tunisia's claims of full sovereignty over maritime areas
adjacent to her coasts, and, on the other, her claims to exclusive,
State, contrary to the Generally applicable rules of international law, clearly, effectively,
continuously, and over a substantial period of time, exercises sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of States." A similar definition is given by Y.Z. BLUM, surpa
note 5, at 261:
The term 'historic waters' is applied nowadays in respect of maritime areas in
general, with reference to bodies of water which- in spite of their being situated
beyond the normal limits of a State's maritime domain-are treated as if they were
part of the maritime appurtenance of the littoral State. This term denotes all
waters which ... are subject to the riparian State's authority in derogation of the
normally applicable rules of international law.
7. See L.J. BoucHEZ, supra note 1, at 199: "Historic bays are a species of the genus of
historic waters. In other words, historic waters are the category of which historic bays form
a part." The same view was expressed by Y.z. BLUM, supra note 5, at 262: "[F)rom the legal
point of view, the theory of 'historic bays' forms only one aspect of the more general doctrine of 'historic waters' ... ."
On "historic" bays and waters see also Anzilotti, Baie Storiche: Loro Caratteri; Rapportie
Fra Gli Stati Costieri, 11 RIV. DIR. INT. 362 (1917); JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS
AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 383 (1927); BOURQUIN, LES BAIES HISTORIQUES 37 (1952); Florio, Baie
Storiche, 2 NOVISSIMO DIGESTO ITALIANO 200 (1968); Les Baies Historiques, Memorandum
Prepare par le Secretariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/1,
reprinted in I UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICAL RECORDS 1 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as I UN CLOS OFFICAL RECORDS (1958)); Juridical Regime of Historic Waters,
Including Historic Bays, Study Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. DOC.A/CN.4/143 (1962),
reprinted in (1962) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
8. See L.J. BOU CHEZ, supra note 1, at 238: "As regards claims to historic rights over parts
of the sea, a distinction must be made between (1) historic rights resulting in sovereignty
over a certain part of the sea, and (2) historic rights establishing special fishing rights."
The same distinction was insisted upon by Y.Z. BLUM, supra note 5, at 247-48, who rightly
added that:
Both categories of such rights may justly be termed "historic rights." It would
appear, however, that only the first kind of historic rights relates to "historic
waters" properly so-called, whereas the second deals with what may be termed
"non-exclusive historic rights," in the sense that they do not imply a claim of full
sovereignty.
On the distinction between full sovereignty and "sovereign rights" for limited purposes,
as referred to in this article, see generally Sperduti, supra note 5, at 61-63.
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though less far-ranging, rights over specific areas of the high seas.
Both these types of claims must be examined as to their conformity
to general international law. Wherever it appears impossible, or
simply difficult, to justify Tunisia's claims in light of the general
rules in force, it will be necessary to ascertain whether those claims
can be justified on the basis of a "historic title."

II. THE DELIMITATION OF TUNISIA'S TERRITORIAL
SEA AND THE THEORY OF "HISTORIC WATERS"
A. RECENT TUNISIAN LEGISLATION ON TERRITORIAL WATERS:
THE ADOPTION OF A TWELVE-MILE LIMIT FOR THE
TERRITORIAL SEA
The most recent Tunisian provisions on the delimitation of her
territorial sea are the law of August 2, 1973 n. 73-499 and the decree
of November 3, 1973, which deals more specifically with the drawing of baselines. 10 The 1973 law fixes the breadth of Tunisia's territorial waters at twelve nautical miles from the baselines. In order
to determine these baselines, it adopts a combination of the traditional method, based on the low-water mark, and the method of
straight baselines. It makes particular reference to straight
baselines to be drawn in the shoaly areas of Chebba and the
Kerkennah Islands, and to the closing lines of the Gulfs of Tunis
and Gabes. 11
It seems unnecessary to devote much attention to the adoption of a twelve-mile limit for the territorial sea. In this respect
the 1973 Tunisian law appears to conform with current international
law, or at least is part of a widespread trend on the part of states
which has been sanctioned by the 1982 United Nations Convention
9. Law No. 73-49 of August 2, 1973, reprinted in Journal Officiel de la Republique
Tunisienne 1189 (31 juillet/3-7 aout 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Tunisian Law].
10. Decree No. 73-527 of November 3, 1973, reprinted in Journal Officel de la
Republique Tunisienne 1679 (2 - 6 Novembre 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Tunisian Decree].
11. 1973 Tunisian Law, supra note 9, art. 1:
La mer territoriale tunisienne est constituee, de la frontiere tuniso-algerienne a
la frontiere tuniso-libyenne et autour des iles, des hauts-fonds de Chebba et des
Ues Kerkennah ou sont installees des pecheries fixes et des hauts-fonds decouvrants
d'El Bibane, par la partie de la mer qui s'etend jusqu'a une limite fixee a 12 milles
marins a partir de lignes de base. Les lignes de base sont constituees par la laisse
de basse mer ainsi que par lee lignes de base droites tirees vers les hauts-fonds
de Chebba et des flee Kerkennah ou sont installees des p~cheries fixes, et par les
lignes de fermeture des golfes de Tunis et de Gabes. Ces lignes de base seront
precisees par decret.
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on the Law of the Sea. 12 There seems, therefore, to be no need to
appeal to the theory of "historic waters" in order to justify Tunisia's
decision.
In any case, one could add that the adoption of the twelve-mile
limit, which goes back to 1973, has not provoked official protests
from ot.her Mediterranean states which are most affected by
Tunisia's decision. Even Libya, which also has a twelve-mile territorial sea, expressly stated in her memorial to the International
Court of Justice on the dispute with Tunisia over the delimitation
of the continental shelf that she "does not contest Tunisia's claim
to a 12-mile territorial sea." 13 With regard to Italy, which in 1974
also adopted a twelve-mile territorial sea,H one should note the·1979
Shipping Ministry decree establishing a biological resources protection area which expressly refers to Tunisia's twelve-mile territorial limit. 15
12. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 3, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1272 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention]: "Breadth of the Territorial Sea. Every state has the
right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." According
to a number of legal writers, the 12-mile limit for the breadth of the territorial sea can
currently be regarded as part of customary international law. See ROUSSEAU, 2 DROIT, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 363 (1980); B. CONFORTI. LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 189-90 (2 ed.
1982). According to D.P. CONNELL. THE INTERNATIONAL LA w OF THE SEA 166 (1982), "the twelvemile limit must be accepted as enjoying the same status and relative position as the threemile limit previously enjoyed." The adoption of a 12-mile territorial sea by Tunisia was regarded as being in conformity with customary international law by F. MOUSSA, supra note l, at
36-40.
13. Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 505. Libya adopted a 12-mile territorial sea in
1959. See Act No. 2 of February 18, 1959, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES.
NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA. U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 14 (1974) (hereinafter cited as UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES
(1974)).
14. Law No. 359 of August 14, 1974 amending Article 2 of the Code of Naviagtion
of 1942, reprinted in 218 GAZ. UFF. (August 24, 1974), english translation reprinted in [1975)
ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 332 (1975).
15. Decreto Miniseriale of September 25, 1979, 275 GAZ. UFF. (October 8, 1979). A
translation of the 1979 decree is as follows:
The Minister of the Merchant Navy, Considering the necessity to ensure the defense
of the biological resources existing in certain zones of the high sea in order to
guarantee the fishingness of waters in which operate the Italian fishing-boats;
... considering that the part of the sea delimited by a line which, starting from
the point of arrival of the line of the twelve miles of the Tunisian territorial waters
connects, on the parallel of Ras Kapoudia, with the 50m. isobath and follows that
isobath to its meeting-point with the line departing from Ras Agadir to the
North-East-ZV =45°, is traditionally recognized as a zone of fishing restocking;
Decrees: It is prohibited to Italian nationals and to fishing-boats flying the Italian
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B. THE CLOSURE OF THE GULF OF TUNIS

Turning now to the more controversial aspect of the 1973 Tunisian measures (the adoption of certain straight baselines for the
measurement of the territorial sea) it seems convenient to first
examine the legality of the closure of the Gulf of Tunis. Article 1
of the 1973 Tunisian Decree states that the closing line of the Gulf
consists of three lines uniting Cape Sidi Ali Mekki, Plane Island,
the northern extremity of Zembra Island, and Cape Bon. Article
2(a) of the 1973 Tunisian Law expressly refers to the waters of the
Gulf as being "internal waters." 16
The Gulf of Tunis has been considered an example of an
"historic bay" by many legal writers, 17 and is classed as such in the
memorandum on historic bays prepared by the United Nations
Secretariat for the 1958 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. 18
However, before undertaking an investigation of the possibilities
of applying the "historic bay" theory to this case, it is convenient .
first to ascertain if, in present circumstances, the closure of the
Gulf of Tunis could not be justified under the existing rules of
customary international law.

flag to carry on fishing activities in the zone of the sea as defined in the premises.
Libyan Counter Memorial, supra note 2, at 60-61.
A reference to Tunisia's 12-mile territorial sea is also present in Article XII of the fishery
agreement c~ncluded by Italy and Tunisia in 1976. Accord du 19Juin1976 entre le Gouverne-

ment de la Republique Tunisienne et le Gouvernement de la Republique Italienne Relatif a la
Peche dans les Eaux Tunisiennes par des Nationaux Italiennes, reprinted in 59 RIV. DIR. INT.

859 (1976).
16. According to Article 1(3) of the 1973 Tunisian Decree, supra note 9, art. 1(3), the
closing line of the Gulf of Tunis consists of "les lignes de base droites joignont le cap Sidi
Ali Mekki, l'ile Plane, la pointe nord de l'ile Zembra et le cap Bon." Article 2(a) of the 1973
Tunisian Law, supra note 9, 2(a), states as follows: "Font partie des eaux interieures: a) les
eaux du golfe de Tunis jusqu'a la ligne joignant le cap Sidi Ali el Mekki, l'ile Plane, la pointe
nord de l'ile de Zembra et le Bon."
.
17. According to G. GIGEL, supra note 1, at 663, "Le golfe de Tunis constitute des eaux
historiques." The same view was expressed by SERINI, 2 Orn. INT. 575 (1958); DELBEZ, LES
PRINCIPES GENERAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBJ,IC 231 (3d ed. 1964); Florio, supra note
7, at 200; VERZIJL. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 925 (1970). Other writers
have referred to the Gulf of Tunis as a possible example of an "historic bay." See BARILE,
I DIRITTI ASSOLUTI NELL'0RDINAMENTO INTERNAZIONALE 179 (1951); B. PALLIERI, DIRITTO INTER·
NAZIONALE PUBLICO 425 (8th ed. 1962); CAVARE, 2 LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POSITIF 683
(2d ed. 1962); M. STROHL, supra note l, at 263; L.J. BoUCHEZ, supra note l, at 221; F. LAURIA,
supra note 1, at 171; Barrie, supra note 1, at 53; ROUSSEAU, supra note 12, at 391.
18. BOURQUIN, supra note 7, at 8.
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To undertake such an examination, the necessary starting
points are Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 10 of the 1982
Montego Bay Convention, both of which deal with bays and are,
in substance, identical. Both Articles define a "bay" as a well-marked
indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width
of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more
than a mere curvature of the coast. In addition, the area of the bay
must be as large as, or larger than, that of a semicircle whose
diameter is a line drawn across its mouth. 19 Once these criteria have
been fulfilled and an indentation has been found to constitute a
"bay," a closing line may be drawn across its natural entrance points
if the distance between these points does not exceed twenty-four
miles. 20
Neither the 1958 Geneva Convention (which Tunisia has signed
but not ratified) nor the 1982 Montego Bay Convention are binding on Tunisia. 21 It does, however, appear that the articles just mentioned could at least be regarded as a necessary point of departure
for determining where customary international law lies on this matter. The twenty-four mile limit for the closing of bays, for example,

19. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 7(2), done Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea] is as follows:
For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked
waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation
shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger
than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of
that indentation.
Article 10(2) of the 1982 Convention, supra note 12, art. 10(2), defines a "bay" in terms
identical to those of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea.
20. Article 7(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 7(4),
is as follows: "If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points
of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two
low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters."
The same words are used in Article 10(4) of the 1982 Convention, supra note 12, art. 10(4).
21. Tunisia signed the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea on October 30, 1958,
but has not ratified it. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status
as at 31December1982, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/2 609 (1982). As for the 1982 Convention,
which will enter into force 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument
of ratification or accession, Tunisia signed it on December 10, 1982. See 21I.L.M.1477 (1982).
To date, however, Tunisia has not ratified the convention. See 23 I.L.M. 235 (1984).
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can probably be currently regarded as part of existing customary
law. 22
The first question is whether the Gulf of Tunis can be regarded
as a "bay" in the terms of Article 7 of the Geneva Convention and
Article 10 of the Montego Bay Convention. Undoubtedly, it is a wellmarked indentation and certainly appears to be more than a mere
curvature of the coast. A glance at the map will tell us that much.
It is also undeniable that the Gulf would pass the semi-circle test
if the straight line joining Cape Sidi Ali Mekki to Cape Bon was
taken as the proper diameter. However, a complication arises
through the presence of the Islands of Plane and, Zembra which,
although situated at the entrance to the Gulf, lie seaward of the
Cape Sidi Ali Mekka/Cape Bon line.
Both Article 7(3) of the Geneva Convention and Article 10(3)
of the Montego Bay Convention deal with so-called "multi-mouthed"
bays in the following terms:
Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has
more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as
long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different
mounts ....23

This criterion has caused some perplexity, mainly because of its
vague wording which makes it difficult to apply to the great variety
of concrete situations. It is not clear, in particular, whether it is
to be applied only when the islands lie on the line of axis of the
headlands of the bay or whether it also contemplates the ease of
islands lying seaward of such a line. 2' Nor should it be overlooked
22. One should observe, inter alia, that the 24-mile limit was adopted in 1958 in connection with the tendency of certain states to fix the maximum breadth of the territorial
sea at 12 miles. See III UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LA w OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS
145 (1958) [hereinafter cited as III UN CLOS OFFICIAL RECORD__§ .(1958)). By basing the adoption of the 24-mile limit on its relationship with the supposed limit of the territorial sea,
those states seemed to embrace the theory- already suggested by several writers - that
coastal states could claim sovereignty over bays whose entrance did not exceed twice the
breadth of their territorial sea. See also WESTLAKE. INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (2d ed. 1910);
LE FUR. PRECIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 427 (4th ed. 1939); FLORIO, IL MARE TERRITORIALE ELA SuA DELIMITAZIONE 104 (1947). In 1958, the 24-mile limit for bays was not yet
a reflection of customary international law, since there was no generally accepted limit to
the breadth of the territorial sea. This is no longer true today, where the 12-mile limit is
regarded as part of existing customary international law. See 1982 Convention, supra note 12.
23. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 7(3); 1982 Convention,
supra note 12, art. 10(3).
24. See Alexander, Baseline Delimitation and Maritime Boundaries, 23 VA. J. INT'L. L.
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that the exact conformity of Article 7(3) of the Geneva Convention
and Article 10(3) of the Montego Bay Convention with customary
law (not to mention the semi-circle test itself) has been contested
by legal writers.25 However, it would seem in this case that the semicircle test would be satisfied even using as the diameter the sum
total of the lengths of the lines across the three mouths of the Gulf
of Tunis resulting from the presence of the Islands of Plane and
Zembra. 26
Having discussed the possibility of the Gulf of Tunis being a
"juridical" bay, it remains to be seen whether international law
allows for its closure. It must be observed, in this connection, that
the distance between the headlands of the Gulf is far greater than
that of the twenty-four miles established by customary international
law. 27 However, as we have seen, the closing line of the Gulf, as
described in the 1973 Tunisian Decree, is not constituted by one
line joining its entrance points on the mainland, but rather by three
straight lines drawn across three mouths resulting from the
presence of the Islands of Plane and Zembra.
Article 7(4) of the 1958 Geneva Convention and Article 10(4)
of the 1982 Montego Bay Convention seem only to allow for the
drawing of one single closing line joining the "natural entrance
points" of a bay. In other words, the presence of isfands at the
entrance of a bay seems to be relevant only for the purpose of
applying the semi-circle test, and not as a justification for the drawing of closing lines differing from the line of axis of the headlands,
particularly lines more advantageous to the coastal state.28 Nevertheless, considering the ambiguous wording and the vagueness of
the codified rules, together with the specific circumstances of the
case in point, it would be hasty to conclude that the closing lines
503, 512 (1983). According to D.P. O'CONNELL, SU'JY1'a note 12, at 403, "the text is careful not
to require that the islands lie on the line of the axis to the headlands: they might lie seaward
of it, provided they create more than one mouth to the bay."
25. See D.P. O'CONNELL, SU'JY1'a note 12, at 393.
26. A number of legal writers have expressed no doubt as to the possibility of the
Gulf of Tunis being a "juridical bay." According to M. STROHL, SU'JY1'a note l, at 263, the Gulf
can be considered as a bay, "within the meaning of Article 7, paragraph 2 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention." The same view is held by F. MOUSSA, SU'JY1'a note 1, at 43.
27. The distance between Cape Sidi Ali Mekki and Cape Bon is 38 miles, according
to the available nautical charts. [cite].
28. Hodgson & Alexander, Toward an Objective Analysis of Special Circumstances, in
LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, PAPER No.13, 10 (1973); BOWELL, THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDS
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of the Gulf of Tunis are unlawful.
In this connection, it seems useful to refer to a theory put forward by some legal writers suggesting that, where islands are
closely spaced and lie off what would otherwise be a "natural
entrance point" of a bay, it may be legitimate to treat the outermost islands as the entrance t'o the bay rather than the headlands
on the main coast. If one agrees with this theory, the lawfulness of
the closing lines of the Gulf of Tunis would be established, since
the "natural entrance points" of the Gulf would be the Islands of
Plane and Zembra, which are about twenty-three miles apart. The
opinion of Gidel may also be quoted on this point. When describing the Gulf of Tunis (which he considered to be "des eaux
historiques") he referred to its entrance as bein~ of twenty-thr~e
miles across, "suivant une ligne tiree entre l'ile Plane et l'ile
Zembra." 29 Other writers too, have referred to the entrance of the
Gulf as being about twenty-three miles across. 30
In any case, if the closing lines of the Gulf of Tunis were considered as not in conformity with the international rules on bays,
their lawfulness could probably be established with reference to
the more general rules on the straight baseline system: Article 4
of the 1958 Geneva Convention and the almost identical Article 7
of the 1982 Montego Bay Convention.31 In fact, it has been held that
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-31 (1972); D.P. O'CONNELL. supra note 12, at 413-15.
29. G. GIGEL, supra note 1, at 663.
30. According to M. STROHL. supra note 1, at 263, "(t]he Gulf of Tunis has a closing line
of about 23 miles and an indentation of 22 miles." The same view is expressed by L.J.
BOUCHEZ, supra note 1, at 221; F. LAURIA. supra note 1, at 171; Barrie, supra note l, at 53; F.
MOUSSA, supra note 1, at 43 n.1. See also BOURQUIN, supra note 7, at 8. Even Libya, during the
dispute with Tunisia over the continental shelf, referred to the Gulf of Tunis as being "23
nautical miles across." See Libyan Reply, supra note 2, at 15.
31. Both Article 4(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, and Article 7(1)
of the 1982 Convention, state the conditions for employing the method of straight baselines
in the following terms:
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there
is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 4(1); 1982 Convention, supra note
12, art. 7(1).
Once the straight baseline system has been found to be applicable from a general point
of view, the drawing of each baseline must satisfy certain fundamental prerequisites.
According to Article 4(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention, and Article 7(3) of the 1982 Convention, the drawing of straight baselines "must not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters."
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coastal states can also apply the rules on the straight baseline
system to bays, provided the conditions laid down in the articles
just mentioned are satisfied. 32 This article does not discuss the
validity of such a theory from a general point of view. Neither is
there an attempt to provide a straightforward answer as to the conformity of the closing lines of the Gulf of Tunis with the customary
rules on the straight baseline system. Given the vagueness and flexibility of those rules, this article confines itself to a few brief
remarks which merely purport to describe one of the possible solutions to the problem.
With regard to the general conditions for the adoption of
straight baselines, one should observe that the coast of Tunisia is
not flat around the area of the gulf. On the contrary, it is as deeply
indented and cut into as the coasts of other states in the same region
which have adopted a system of straight baselines.33 The presence
of the Plane and Zembra Islands should also be taken into account. 34
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, SU]YT'a note 19, art. 4(2); 1982 Convention, SU]YT'a note
12, art. 7(3).
32. See Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73, 79-81 (1959), "the limit of twenty-four miles applicable to the closing line
of a bay as such, does not apply where a longer line can be justified as part of a baseline
system on a coast possessing the configuration warranting the use of such a system." The
same view has been expressed by Ronzitti, Som:mergibili nmi Identijicati, Pretese Baie St<Yri..che
e Contromisure dello Stato Costiero, 66 RIV. DIR. INT. 5, 35-39 (1983); Ronzitti, Is the Gulf of
Taranto an Historic Bay?, 11 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 275 (1984); de Guttry, LaDelimitazione
delle Acque Territoriali nel Mar Mediterraneo (unpublished) (1985); de Guttry, The Delimitation of Territorial Waters in the Mediterranean Sea, 11 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 377 (1984);
See Continental Shelf, SU]YT'a note 3, at 316-17 (J. Evenson dissenting), with specific reference
to the Gulf of Gabes.
33. As is well known, the conventional rules on straight baselines emerged from the
1951 judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case. Fisheries Case,
su]YT'a note 6. The Court found that "where a coast is deeply indented and cut into, as is
that of Eastern Finnmark, or where it is bordered by an archipelago such as the 'skjaegaard'
along the western sector of the coast here in question, the base-line becomes independent
of the low-water mark, and can only be determined by means of a geometric construction
... nor can one speak of exceptions when contemplating so rugged a coast in detail. Such
a coast, viewed as a whole calls for the application of a different method." Id. at 128-29.
Despite the words used by the Court in 1951, however, it would be difficult nowadays to
maintain that the straight baseline system could only be employed in localities where the
coastline is at least as deeply indented and cut into as that of Norway: in fact, subsequent
state practice has proved that the attempt thus to restrict the scope of the straight baseline
method has failed. See D.P. O'CONNELL. supra note 12, at 214. On the practice of states in the
Mediterranean regions, see de Guttry, supra note 32, at 377.
34. According to Fitzmaurice:
[t]he use of the term "fringe" in paragraph 1 of the article ... is of interest because
it implies, and is intended to imply, that the mere existence of islands off a coast
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As to the conformity of these lines with the prerequisites
established in the codified rules, it is to be noted, in the first place,
that these rules do not place exact limits to the length of straight
baselines:35 what is important is that the baselines do not depart
to any appreciable extent from the _general direction of the coast.
If, then, we admit that the general direction of the coast in a bay
should be represented by its natural entrance points, 36 it follows
that the closing lines of the Gulf of Tunis do not depart to any
appreciable extent from .the general direction of the coast of
northern Tunisia.
Coming now to the second prerequisite, it can probably be
asserted that the waters within the closing lines are sufficiently
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters. Leaving aside the question of the exact meaning
of this prerequisite,37 it should be pointed out that the waters of
the Gulf of Tunis do not seem to be of much importance for the
routes of international communication since it is quite possible to
pass through the Sicilian Channel from east to west and the reverse
without having to cross the Gulf itself. While third states do not
seem to be particularly affected by Tunisia's decision, at least as
far as freedom of navigation is concerned, it is clearly of considerable
importance to Tunisia to be able to exercise full sovereignty over
the Gulf. In regard to this it should be noted that Tunisia has exercised sovereign rights over the coral reefs in this area from time
is not a ground for using straight baselines. What is required is a continuous fringe
... sufficiently solid and close the the mainland to form a unity with it, or an
extension of it in the seaward direction.
Fitzmaurice, supra note 32, at 78. This view has been contradicted by post-Geneva practice
and, according to D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 215-16, can no longer be sustained.
35. It is a well known fact that several attempts were made at the Geneva Conven·
tion to introduce arithmetic limits to straight baselines, but all these attempts failed. See
Voelkel, Les Lignes de Base dans la Convention de Geneve sur la Mer Territoriale, 19 AN.
FR. DR. INT. 820, 827 (1973).
36. See Ronzitti, supra note 32, at 41. See also Johnson, The Anglo-Norwegian Fi.c;herie.-;
Case, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 145, 61 (1952), who observed that "baselines across well defined
bays must be presumed to follow the general direction of the coast." From a general point
of view, one cannot but agree with Alexander, supra note 24, at 515, that "no universally
accepted criteria exist for determining whether or not a baseline system follows the general
direction of the coast."
37. According to Alexander, id. at 516, "no systematic analyses of the possible
parameters of such a linkage have been made." A possible answer might lie in an assessment of the reasonableness of the coastal state's claim: that is, balancing the interests of
the coastal state and those of third states. See Ronzitti, supra note 32, at 43.
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immemorial. 38 An appeal to these traditional rights would also be
justified by Article 4(4) of the Geneva Convention and Article 7(5)
of the Montego Bay Convention, which state that,
Where the method of straight baselines is applicable ... account
may be taken in determining particular baselines, of economic
interests peculiar to the region concerned the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage.

It should be understood, however, that these traditional rights (the
exact content of which need not be examined here) would not come
into consideration as "historical rights" in the sense in which this
expression is used in this paper (that is, as rights acquired in derogation to the normally applicable rules), but would rather come into
consideration as one of the factors having some bearing on the concrete application of rules of customary international law.89
It seems, therefore, that the Tunisian decision to close the Gulf
of Tunis can in any case be justified in light of the existing law.
It is, however, necessary to point out that the juridical regime of
waters within the closing lines will differ according to whether the
closure is justified on the basis of the international rules on bays,
38. According to F. MoussA. supra note l, at 19 n.7, the Bey of Tunis had asserted a
right to license the exploitation of the coral reefs along the northern coast of Tunisia since
1117. Foreigners were allowed to fish in this area on payment of certain sums of money.
In this connection, it might be interesting to quote Article 15 of a Treaty concluded on May
20, 1604 between Henry IV of France and the Turkish Sultan Amat. According to the Treaty,
French nationals were permitted to fish:
du Poisson & Corail ... en particulier aux lieux de la Jurisdiction de nos Rioaumes
d'Alger & Thunis, sans qu'il leur soit donne aucun trouble ni empeschement. Confirmons toutes les permissions qui ont ete donnes par nos Aieuls ... sans qe'elles
soient sujettes a autre confirmation qu'a celle qui en ete faite d'anciennete.
See (entire text of this clause), reprinted in T. SCOVAZZI. LA PESCA NELL' EVOLUZIONE DEL
DIRITTO DEL MARE 83 (1979). By a treaty of October 26, 1832, the Bey of Tunis conceded the
exclusive right to exploit the coral reefs to France, in exchange for an annual revenue of
13,500 piasters. See F. MoussA. supra note 1, at 19. When describing Tunisian sedentary
fisheries, Gidel observed that "les fonds coralligens de la cote Nord sont l'objet d'un fermage du Governement Tunisien" G. GIOEL. supra note l, at 491. With specific reference to
the Gulf of Tunis, which he considered to be "des eaux historiques," Gidel added that "les
Etats etrangers n'ont jamais proteste contre les reglementations diverses appliques dans
les eaux de ce golfe." Id. at 663.
39. Johnson, rightly pointed out with reference to the Fisheries Case:
by laying so much stress ... on the flexibility of the general rules of international
law relating to delimitation ... and by including "long usage" as a factor to be
considered in assessing the validity, even under general international law, of straight
baselines drawn, not across bays only, but across sea areas "sufficiently closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters," the Court
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or of the more general rules on the straight baseline system. In
the former case, the waters of the Gulf would come under the
category of internal waters to all effects: in particular, that so-called
"right of innocent passage" would not apply. 40 In the latter case,
Article 5(2) of the Geneva Convention and Article 8(2) of the
Montego Bay Convention would have to be taken into consideration. These articles require that coastal states, which have adopted
the straight baseline system, allow innocent passage in those areas
within the baselines which had previously been considered as part
of their territorial sea or of the high seas. 41
The conclusion to be drawn at this point is that there is no
need in the present situation to appeal to the doctrine of "historical
waters" in order to justify the decision to close the Gulf of Tunis.
It may be added that Tunisia's decision does not seem to have provoked adverse reactions on the part of other states. But this silence
can probably be explained as expressing a conviction that the
closure of the Gulf conforms with existing law, rather than as implying acquiescence to an exceptional and unjustified claim.
The 1973 legislation was in fact the culmination of a long
process of development in the claims of Tunisia over the Gulf of
Tunis, a process which began at least by 1951. A decree of July
26, 1951, on fishing included the Gulf in a fishing zone reserved for
immeasurably reduced the scope of "historic waters" as waters specially exempted,
by virtue of an historic title, from general rules of law.
Johnson, supra note 36, at 163-64. Blum added that "the Fisheries Case, no doubt, represented
an attempt to incorporate, as it were, the doctrine of historic waters into general international law and to transform what was always considered as an exception to the rule into
one aspect of the general norm." Y.Z. BLUM. supra note 5, at 286. The same considerations
are valid with regard to the rules on straight baselines laid down in the 1958 Geneva Convention and in the 1982 Convention in which effect was given to the principles enunciated
by the International Court of Justice in 1951. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra
note 19, art. 4; 1982 Convention, supra note 12, art. 8. On the relationship between the
controversial character of the standard rules and the doctrine of "historic waters," see also
D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 417. A similar opinion was expressed by BOURQUIN, supra
note 7, at 37, with specific reference to "historic" bays, at a time when no certainty existed
as to the "territoriality" of bays.
40. See L.J. BoucHEZ. supra note l, at 109.
41. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, Article 5(2) is as follows:
Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 4
has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as part of the territorial sea, or of the high seas, a right of innocent passage,
as provided in Articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters.
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 5(2). Similar provisions are contained in Article 8(2) of the 1982 Convention, supra note 12, art. 8(2).
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French and Tunisian nationals only.'2 The Gulf was then claimed
as "territorial'' sea by Laws No. 62-35 of October 16, 1962ca and No.
63-49 of December 30, 1963." Finally, as we have seen, the Gulf was
included in Tunisian internal waters in 1973.
Certain of the states most affected by these claims have
expressly adopted a favorable attitude towards them. Italy
expressly recognized the "territoriality" of the waters of the Gulf
of Tunis in the fishery agreements she concluded with Tu~isia in
1963 and 1971.'5 After the enactment of the 1973 Tunisian legislation, another fishery agreement concluded by Italy and Tunisia
expressly mentioned the baselines for the measurement of Tunisia's
territorial sea when defining the areas of "Tunisian waters" within
42. Decree of July 26, 1951, reprinted in Journal Officiel de la Republique Tunisienne,
July 31, 1951, at 950 [hereinafter cited as 1951 Tunisian Decree].
43. Law No. 62-35 of October 16, 1962, reprinted in Journal Officiel de la Republique
Tunisienne, October 12-16, 1962, at 1224 [hereinafter cited as1962 Tunisian Law]. The text
of the 1951 Tunisian Decree, supra note 42, as modified by the 1962 law is as follows:
Est denommee mer territoriale tunisienne: a) de la frontiere tuniso-algerienne
a Ras Kapoudia et autour des iles adjacentes la pattie de la mer comprise entre
la laisse de basse mer et une ligne·parallele tracee a 6 milles au large, a I'exception
du golfe de Tunis qui, a l'interieur de la ligne cap Farina, ile Plane, Ile Zembra
et cap Bon, est entierement compris dans ladite mer. Au large de la mer territoriale
delimitee ci-dessus, une zone est reservee dans laquelle, seuls pourroilt etre
autorises a pratiquer la peche les navires battant pavilion tunisien. La zone de peche
est fixee a 12 milles a partir .de la ligne de base qui sert de point de depart pour
mesurer la largeur de la mer territoriale telle qu'elle est determinee au paragraphe
a) ci-dessus.
Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 533.
44. Law No. 63-49 of December 30, 1963, reprinted in Journal Officiel de la Republique
Tunisienne, December 31, 1963, at 1870 [hereinafter cited as 1963 Tunisian Law]. The 1963
law is also published in Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, at 408. With regard to waters
adjacent to the coast of Tunisia, this law confirmed the previous law of October 16, 1962.
For text see infra note 106.
45. Accord du 20 aout 1971 entre le Gouvernement de la Republique Tunisienne et
le Gouvernement de la Republique italienne relatif a la pratique, par les Pecheurs Italiens,
de la Peche dans les eaux Tunisiennes, article l(a) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Agreement]:
Le Gouvernement de la Republique italienne reconnait que la zone de peche
reservee aux navires battant pavilion tunisien est definie comme suit: a) De la
frontiere tuniso-algerienne a Ras Kapoudia et autour des hes adjacentes: La partie de la mer contique a la mer territoriale et comprise entre la linge de 6 milles
et la ligne de 12 milles mesures a partir de la laisse de basse mer, Le golfe de
Tunis a l'interieur de la ligne joignant le cap Farina, l'ile Plane, l'ile Zembra et
le cap Bon est entierement compris dans la mer territoriale.
Text of the 1963 Agreement is reprinted in 58 RIV. DIR. INT. 840 (1975), as well as Tunisian
Memorial, supra note 2, annex 5, at 214. The 1963 Agreement was replaced by another fishery
agreement concluded by Italy and Tunisia on August 20, 1971. See 58 RIV. DIR. INT. 845 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Agreement]. Article 1 of the 1971 Agreement is also reprinted
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which Italian vessels would be allowed to fish along the northern
coast of Tunisia.' 11
Libya, for her part, vigorously contested the validity of the
Tunisian baselines during the dispute over the delimitation of the
continental shelf. 47 However, for obvious reasons, Libya concentrated her efforts on demonstrating the invalidity of the baselines
drawn in the region of the Gulf of Gabes.'8 As regards the Gulf of
Tunis, Libya's attitude was far more cautious and might be interpreted as in fact an acceptance of Tunisia's claim.'9
in Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, annex 6, at 218. Article l(a) of the 1971 agreement repeats
Italy's recognition of the "territoriality" of the Gulf of Tunis in terms identical to those
employed in the 1963 agreement. On these agreements, see Scovazzi, La Pesca Nelle Acque
Comprese Fra Italia e Tunisia, 50 RIV. DIR. INT. 731 (1975).
46. Article l(a) of the 1976 fishing agreement between Italy and Tunisia is as follows:
Le Gouvernement de la Republique tunisienne autorisera des bateaux italiens
a pratiquer la peche dans les eaux tunisiennes. Cette autorisation s'exercera dans
Jes zones et aux conditions indiquees ci-apres: a) Zone entre la frontiere
tuniso-algerienne et le cap Bon: Cette zone est definie par la partie de la mer
s'etendant entre le meridien passant par la frontiere tuniso-algerienne et la partie
est due parallele passant par le cap Bon et comprise entre la ligne des 6 milles
et celle des 12 milles mesures a partir des lignes de base servant a la delimitation
des eaux territoriales tunisiennes.
Accord du 19 juin 1976 entre le Gouvernement de la Republique Tunisienne et le Gouvernement de la Republique Italienne relatif a la peche dans les eaux Tunisiennes par des Nationaux
Italiens, Article 1, reprinted in 59 RIV. DIR. INT. 859 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Agreement]. On this agreement, which terminated in 1979, see Scovazzi, L 'Accordo di Pesca ItaloTunisino del 19 Giugno 1976, 59 RIV. DIR. INT. 761 (1976).
47. With reference to Articles 1 and 4 of the 1973 Tunisian Law, supra note 9, and
to Article 1 of the 1973 Tunisian Decree, supra note 10, the Libyan Memorial, supra note
2, at 478, stressed that Libya "does not admit the validity of these baselines in international law and also denies that they are opposable to Libya in the context of the present case."
48. See infra text accompanying notes 50-85.
49. The Libyan Memorial states that the fact that the 1963 Tunisian Law, supra note
44, only claimed sovereignty over the Gulf of Tunis (and not over the Gulf of Gabes) led
to the conclusion that "only the Gulf of Tunis (and not the Gulf of Gabes) merited closure
by a straight closing line on the basis that it was an 'historic' bay." Libyan Memorial,.supra
note 2, at 502. Again in her reply to the Court, Libya pointed out that:
the Tunisian 1963 Law failed to identify the Gulf of Gabes as a historic bay and
in fact provided for the Tunisian territorial sea to be measured from the low-water
mark along the shoreline of the Gulf.... The same Law, however, did close the
Gulf of Tunis, which is 23 nautical miles across; there is thus clear evidence on
the record that although Tunisia itself officially treated the Gulf of Tunis as a
juridical bay in 1963, the "Gulf of Gabes" was not so considered in the slightest
degree.
Libyan Reply, supra note 2.
These statements could, of course, be interpreted as an attempt on the part of Libya
to strengthen her refusal to consider the Gulf of Gabes as an "historic" bay by drawing

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss2/7

16

Gioia: Tunisia's Claims Over Adjacent Seas

1984)
C.

Tunisia's Claims Over Adjacent Seas

343

THE CLOSURE OF THE GULF OF GARES

Without a doubt the most important new feature of the 1973
Tunisian legislation was the decision to close the Gulf of Gabes, thus
including in Tunisia's internal waters a vast sea area, which had
previously been considered partly Tunisian territorial waters and
partly high seas. In fact, until 1973, the traditional low-water mark
constituted the internal limit of Tunisia's territorial sea in this area,
while the breadth of the territorial sea had been fixed at six nautical
miles by Tunisian Law No. 63-49 of December 30, 1963.50 The waters
of the Gulf of Gabes were therefore included in Tunisia's territorial
sea up to a distance of six miles from the low water mark, while
beyond that limit they were part of an exclusive fishery zone
claimed by Tunisia, which will be examined in the second part of
this paper. 51
According to Article 1(7) of the 1973 Tunisian Decree, the closing line of the Gulf of Gabes is a line joining the buoy ("balise")
of Samoun, which is sited off the Kerkennah Islands (34 34 ' 54' '
and 11 03' 38'' E) and Ras Turques, at the north-eastern extremity
of the island of J erba. Article 2(b) of the 1973 Tunisian Law defines
the waters of the Gulf of Gabes up to the line joining Ras-Es-Moun
and Ras Turques as "internal waters." 52
The choice of a buoy as base point for drawing the closing line
of the Gulf is explained by the fact that this line is a continuation
of a system of straight baselines drawn around the Kerkennah
Islands. All these baselines were drawn using light buoys as base
points; consequently, when drawing the closing line of the Gulf of
Gabes, the starting point was the last base point previously used
(the buoy of Samoun). Leaving aside the problems raised by the
lines drawn around the Kerkennah Islands, which will be discussed
attention to Tunisia's different treatment of the Gulf of Tunis, without taking any position
on the validity of Tunisia's claims over this latter bay. This author, believes, however, that
the same statements, seen in the context of Libya's general attitude towards the closure
of the Gulf of Tunis, might also be interpreted as indicative of Libya's acceptance of Tunisia's
claim.
50. 1963 Tunisian Law, supra note 44, art. 1. For the text of this article see infra note
106.
51. See infra text accompanying notes (point Vil.
52. Article 1(7) of the 1973 Tunisian Decree, supra note 10, describes the closing lines
as "la ligne droite de fermeture du golfe de Gabes joignant la balise Samoum, definie ci-dessus,
et Ras Tourgueness." Article 2(b) of the 1973 Tunisian Law, supra note 9, states that: "Font
partie des eaux interieures: ... b) les eaux du golfe de Gabes jusqu'a la ligne joignant RasEs-Samoun et Ras Tourgueness."
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shortly, 53 we now intend to analyze the lawfulness of the closing
line of the Gulf of Gabes without taking into account the use of a
buoy as one of the base points. Should in fact the use of light buoys
as base points be considered unlawful, the question of whether the
Tunisian government can close the Gulf or not would remain open.
Another preliminary question must be dealt with in order to
"clear the ground": what exactly is meant by the geographical
expression "Gulf of Gabes?" Libya, during the dispute with Tunisia
over the continental shelf, contested the validity of the 1973
Tunisian baselines, basing her case, inter alia, on the fact that she
considered the expression "Gulf of Gabes" to refer to the area of
sea between Ras Yonga, on the mainland, and the north-western
extremity of the island of Jerba. According to Libya, these alone
should be considered as the "natural entrance points" of the Gulf
in the terms of Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. 54 Tunisia,
on the other hand, considers the extent of the Gulf to be much wider.
Whereas the 1973 Tunisian measures seemed to consider Ras-EsMoun and Ras Turques as the natural entrance points of the gulf
during the dispute with Libya over the continental shelf, Tunisia
seemed to go even further, suggesting that Ras Kaboudia should
be considered as the northernmost entrance point of the Gulf.ss
Whichever the case may be, it must be stressed that the
dispute over the natural entrance points of the Gulf of Gabes is
irrelevant to our investigation, since the closure of the Gulf cannot be based on the general rules on bays. It is true that the Gulf
does present the characteristics of a "bay" in the terms of Article
7 of the Geneva Convention and Article 10 of the Montego Bay Convention, even considering the closing line adopted by Tunisia as
the proper diameter for the purposes of the semi-circle test. 56 It
cannot be ignored, however, that this line, which is about forty-five
nautical miles long, far exceeds the maximum limit established by
customary international law for the closing of bays.
Tunisia herself has not based her decision to close the Gulf of
Ga bes on the international rules of "juridical" bays. Neither the
53. See infra text accompanying notes 85a-100.
54. See Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 484, 504. See also Libyan Counter Memorial,
supra note 2, at 36-39.
55. See Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, at 62, 77. See also Tunisian Reply, supra note
2, at 21-22.
56. In this sense, see M. STROHL. supra note l, at 263; F. MoussA, supra note l, at 43.
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1973 Tunisian Law nor the 1973 Tunisian Decree provided any legal
justification for the closure of the Gulf. Moreover, during the dispute with Libya over the continental shelf, Tunisia expressly quoted
Article 7(6) of the Geneva Convention, according to which provisions concerning "juridical" bays "shall not apply to so-called
'historic' bays, or in any case where the straight baseline system
provided for in Article 4 is applied." 57 According to Tunisia, the decision to close the Gulf of Gabes can be based both on the doctrine
of "historical bays" and on the general rules on the straight baseline
system.
In spite of Libya's objections, 511 it must be agreed that if the
Gulf of Ga bes proved to be an "historic bay," the disagreement over
its natural entrance points would become immaterial for establishing
the lawfulness of the closing line adopted by Tunisia. In fact,
"historic bays" are a special case under the more general category
of "historic waters" which covers all sea areas over which a coastal
state has acquired full sovereignty through effective display of
authority and the acquiescence of third states. 59 It follows that the
coastal state can qualify as internal waters all the areas of sea over
which it has "historically" exercised full sovereignty, irrespective
of the natural characteristics of the coast. It is, therefore, necessary
to ascertain whether the Gulf of Gabes can, in effect, be considered
as an "historic bay" or, rather, whether the region of the Gulf of
Gahes can qualify as "historic waters."
The Gulf of Gabes has been cited by several legal writers as
a possible example of an "historic bay ."t:o This opinion is usually
based on that of Gide), who allegedly included the Gulf in the
category of "historic waters." It should be observed, however, that
Gidel was in fact rather cautious when analyzing the juridical regime
of the Gulf. While he did not hesitate to describe the Gulf of Tunis

[>7. S1·1· Tunisian Rt•ply. supra not.t• 2. at. 18 20.
[>8. At•t•ording tot.ht• Libyan Rt•ply, "normally, wht•n a St.alt• t'laims a bay as 'hist.orit·,'
it. woultl ht• t•xpt•t·tt•d that. t.ht• dosing lint• adopkd for t.ht• bay t•oint•idt•s with a lint• joining
I.ht• natural t•nt.rant•t• points oft.ht• bay." Libyan Rt•ply, supra not.t• 2, at 18.
f>~). On I.ht• n•lat.ionship lwlwt•t•n "historic hays" and "historit· wat.t•rs," st·t~ supra nott•s

(; 7.
HO. Sci'. 1'.!f.. CA v AH~: ...;u1wa not.t> 17, at.ti:l8: M. STHOlll .. supra nolt• I. at. 2H:l: L.J. Hm1nu:z.
supra nott• 1, at. 221 -22: D~:i.m:z. supra not.t• 17, at. 231; Florio, supra nott• 7, at 295; Barrie, supra
nott• I. at. 5:l; Rm1ss~:At1. ,.;upra nott• 12, at :mt. S1·1· also Cont.int•ntal ShC'lf, supra nott• 3, at.
ilW 17.
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as "des eaux historiques," 61 when dealing with the Gulf of Tunis,
he confined himself to observing that:
[t]out ce golfe faite partie de la zone spongifere et les profondeurs
n'y atteignent pas 50 metres. II est soumis effectivement a la
jurisdiction tunisienne, sans que celle-ci ait jamais rencontre aucune
opposition de la part des Gouvernements etrangers a I'occasion
des mesures prises contre les pecheurs de toute nationalite poursuivis pour contravention aux reglements de peche tunisiens.62

This passage, rather than establishing once and for all the "historic"
character of the Gulf of Gabes, clearly brings into focus what, in
the opinion of the present writer, is the principle question in this
particular case: Whether it is admissible for a vast extent of sea
to be qualified as internal waters on the strength of rights
"historically" acquired by a coastal state only for fishing purposes.
During the dispute with Tunisia over the continental shelf,
Libya pointed out, inter alia, that: (a) there was no proof that
previous to 1973 Tunisia had denied innocent passage of foreign
vessels in the area over which she claimed "historic rights"; and
(b) as a consequence, one could not properly discuss acquiescence
of third states until after 1973, when, for the first time, the waters
of the Gulf of Gabes were claimed as internal waters. 63
Faced with these objections, Tunisia merely appealed to the
great antiquity of her rights. According to Tunisia, these rights had
been acquired in a far-off period of history, when the present distinction between the various maritime zones was yet unknown. Seen
in this light, the · 1973 Tunisian measures merely "achevaient
l'evolution tendant a reamenager le statut juridique de I' ensemble
de la zone des titre historiques, pour l'adapter aux circonstances
maritimes contemporaines." 6'
Tunisia's reply to Libya's objections is not convincing.
Undoubtedly, as Tunisia pointed out, "historic rights" acquired in
bygone ages can extend over areas of sea or sea-bed which can
nowadays be qualified as internal waters, territorial waters, a
fishery zone, or the continental shelf. But this can only mean that
in order to evaluate the concrete significance of any "historic rights,"
the exact nature of the power effectively exercised by the coastal
61.
62.
63.
64.

See supra note 17.
See G. GIDEL. supra note 1, at 663.
Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 506; Libyan Reply, supra note 2, at 12.
See Tunisian Reply, supra note 2, at 15-20.
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state with the acquiescence of third states must first be ascertained.
An analysis of this kind is indispensible today when determining
if, and to what extent, claims to delimit any maritime zone in derogation to existing international rules can be justified on the basis of
any "historic rights" previously acquired. 65 In the opinion of the
present writer, a state cannot claim a vast area of sea as internal
waters on the sole basis of "historic rights" previously acquired
for fishing purposes, unless it is possible to consider that those
"historic rights" were in fact indicative of a right of full sovereignty. It is undoubtedly true that "the manner in which sovereign rights
are exercised is closely connected with the nature and structure of
the territory." Similarly, it is equally clear that sovereignty over
maritime areas can be exercised through the regulation of fishery,
navigation, security, and other matters, so that "the exercise of all
such regulations can be alleged in support of effective authority
over the water area." 66 However, as Bouchez rightly points out, "the
coastal State must leave no doubt about its intention to claim the
water area as part of the national territory." 67 It is one thing to claim
sovereignty over an area of sea, it is another thing entirely to claim
exclusive rights for limited purposes over portions of the high seas.68
The question of the exact nature and extent of the "historic
rights" claimed by Tunisia in the region of the Gulf of Gabes will
65. It seems interesting to quote, in this connection, the opinion voiced by the 1962
study on the Juridical Regime of Historical Waters:
In principle, the scope of the historic title emerging from the continued exercise of sovereignty should not be wider in scope than the scope of the sovereignty
actually exercised. If the claimant State exercised sovereignty as over internal
waters, the area claimed would be internal waters, and if the sovereignty exercised
was sovereignty as over the territorial sea, the area would be territorial sea.
Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, supra note 7, at 23. The same
is true when it is necessary to ascertain whether the coastal state has effectively claimed
full sovereignty over a body of water, or simply more limited rights as over an area of high
seas.
66. L.J. BouCHEZ, supra note l, at 249. In this sense, see also G. GIGEL, supra note l, at
663 (Ill); M.S. McDOUGAL & W. T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962); Y.Z.
BLUM. supra note 5, at 254-61; Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays,
supra note 7, at 14-15.
67. L.J. BoucHEZ. supra note l, at 249.
68. On this distinction see supra note 8. The distinction seems to have been disregarded
by Francois. When discussing the Tunisian sedentary fisheries in the region of the Gulf
of Gabes, he observed that "le droit de la Tunisie de considerer comme faisant partie des
eaux territoriales toute la zone a l'interieur de la ligne de fonds de 50 metres du Ras Kapoudia
a la frontiere tripolitaine ne saurait done etre serieusement conteste." Franc;ios, supra note
l, at 97 (emphasis added). In fact, Tunisia had never claimed this water area as territorial
waters, but simply as part of a reserved fishery zone, as Franc;ois himself recognized.
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be examined in the second part of this paper. 89 It must be stressed
immediately, however, that until 1973 Tunisia had laid no claim to
full sovereignty over the Gulf of Gabes: she had simply claimed
sovereign rights for the limited purpose of exploiting the natural
resources of the sea and of the sea-bed. Moreover, she had made
it clear on various occasions that her exclusive fishery rights in
the area were considered as rights acquired beyond her territorial
sea. 1° Finally, whenever the attempt had been made to infer from
those exclusive fishery rights the "territoriality" of the Gulf of
Gabes, third states had expressed their dissent. In this light it is
appropriate to mention an important statement made by Italy in
1912 during a dispute with France, who was at the time responsible
for Tunisia's foreign relations. The dispute arose after the capture
of the French postal steamer Tavignano by Italian destroyers off
the coast of Tunisia. France tried to prove that the incident had
taken place in Tunisian territorial waters, basing her case, inter
alia, on the traditional fishing rights claimed by the Beys of Tunis
in the area where the vessel was seized. The Italian government
rejected this argument in the following terms: "De l'avis du
Gouvernement royal, ii n'y a pas lieu de s'occuper de ce pretendu
domaine de la Regence car, en tout cas, ii ne saurait y etre question que d'un droit esclusif de peche, qui n'empecherait pas la mer
d'etre libre a tout autre egard." 11 Again, by Law No. 62-35 of October
16, 1962, Tunisia attempted to include the whole region of the Gulf
of Gabes in her territorial sea. 72 The 1962 Law, however, was
69. See infra text accompanying notes 114-135.
70. This position had been made clear, in the first place, by France, while acting as
protecting power in Tunisia. That France did not regard Tunisia's rights to sedentary fisheries
as synonomous with sovereignty over the superadjacent waters was made clear, for example,
in 1911 during a dispute with Italy, which arose after the capture of two Italian fishing boats
off the Kerkennah Islands. On that occasion, France repeatedly stated that Tunisia's rights
in the area were merely "droits ... a reglementer la peche ... en dehors de la limite des
eaux territoriales tunisiennes." Libyan Reply, supra note 2, at 1-15.
On the position of France, see infra note 99. As for Tunisia's post independence practice, the 1963 Tunisian Law, supra note 44, made it clear that the waters of the Gulf of
Gabes beyond the six mile limit were regarded as part of a contiguous fishery zone, beyond
the territorial sea. See infra note 106.
71. III ITALIAN PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1434 (2d ser. 1979).
72. The 1962 Tunisian Law, Article 1, is as follows:
Est dPnommee mer territoriale tunisienne: b) de Ras Kapoudia a la frontiere tunisolibyenne, la partie de la mer limitee par une ligne qui, partant du point d'aboutissement de la ligne des 12 milles decrite ci-dessus, rejoint sur le parallele de Ras
Kapoudia l'isobath de 50 metres et suit cet isobathe jusqu'a son point de rencontre
avec une ligne partant de Ras Aghdir en direction du nordest ZV =45°.
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opposed by Italy 73 and was quickly repealed by Law No. 63-49 of
December 30, 1963, which made a clear distinction between Tunisia's
six-mile territorial sea, to be measured from the low-water mark,
and a contiguous fishery zone which extended beyond the territorial
sea, up to the fifty-metre isobath. 74
It must, therefore, be concluded that Tunisia's decision to close
the Gulf of Gabes could not be based on the theory of "historic bays."
The 1973 Tunisian legislation could at best be regarded as the
beginning of a process aimed at the formation of a new "historic
title," which would allow Tunisia to qualify the Gulf of Gabes as
internal waters. The attitude of third states should be examined
in this light in order to ascertain whether Tunisia's claim has met
with general acquiescence within the international community. It
would be difficult, however, to speak of general acquiescence of third
states in view of Libya's strong opposition to the 1973 baselines. 75
One could also mention, the attitude of Malta, which has apparently
also contested the Tunisian baselines. 76 Even Italy, which has
1962 Tunisian Law, supra note 43, art. 1.
The adoption of a bathymetric criterion for the measurement of Tunisia's territorial
sea was criticized by Conforti, La Disciplina della Pesca Costiera nella Prassi InternazUmale
Recente, 2 ANNUARIO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [AN. DIR. INT.] 132,140-41 h966).
73. See 27 RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI 639 (1963); F. MOUSSA. supra note 1, at 29-30.
74. See infra note 106.
75. See 1963 Tunisian Law, supra note 47, art. 1. According to the Libyan Memorial,
supra note 2, at 506, manifest in 1973, "Libya took the opportunity of reserving its position
with regard to the 1973 Tunisian Law, and all its implication, in the discussions between
the parties which were currently being held. This reservation was reiterated by the Libyan
Note of 20 January 1979 to Tunisia (attached as Annex 1-27)." See also id. at 550. According
to the Tunisian Counter-Memorial, supra note 2, at 14, however, the 1973 legislation,
"regulierement notifiee la Libye des sa publication, n'a jamais fait l'objet d;une protestation de la part de ce pays, jusqu'a la date du 29 janvier 1979."
With regard to the question of whether Libya has standing to oppose the closing line
of the Gulf of Gabes, it is also necessary to refer to a theory according to which, in the
period of time before the definitive consolidation of an historic title, the principle of reciprocity
would involve an obligation to respect an exceptional claim, on the part of those states which
"have proceeded to the assertion of similar exceptional claims." Francioni, The Gulf of Sirte
Incident (U.S. v. Libya) and International Law, 5 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 100-01 (1980-81).
In this respect, it seems interesting to recall that, while stressing the validity of the closing line of the Gulf of Gabes, Tunisia pointed out that: "une attaque sur ce point est d'ailleur
signuliere, et difficilement recevable, de la part d'un Etat qui a ferme le Golfe de la Syrte
par une ligne de base droite longue de 465 Km., en !'absence de toute justification historique."
Tunisian Counter-Memorial, supra note 2, at 19.
76. According to the Libyan Reply, supra note 2, at 20, it should be noted that "another
State, Malta, similarly has not accepted the 1973 baselines of Tunisia. This fact was placed
on the record by Malta in the oral hearings before this Court in connection with Malta's
request to intervene in the present proceedings." Malta's Application to Intervene, and the
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adopted a favorable attitude toward the close of the Gulf of Tunis,
cannot be said to have acquiesced in Tunisia's claim to close the
Gulf of Gabes, at least as matters stand at present. 77
As to the second justification put forward by Tunisia, namely
that the closure of the Gulf of Gabes could be based on the general
rules on the straight baseline system, it is again necessary to stress
that the great flexibility of these rules might well justify Tunisia's
claim. It is hardly surprising that Judge ad hoc Evenson, in his
dissenting opinion annexed to the 1982 judgment of the International Court of Justice, agreed entirely with Tunisia's opinion. 78 Indeed, Libya's assertion that the Tunisian coastline does not conform with the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention since, "unlike the Norwegian coast, it is not deeply
indented" 79 seems nowadays untenable. 80 It would also be difficult
to agree with Libya that the Kerkennah Islands are not "part of
an island fringe" but merely "two localised and isolated islands." 81
consequent proceedings, see Memorial of Tunisia, supra note 2.
77. As previously discussed, supra notes 72-74, Italy's protest against the 1962 Tunisian Law (which attempted to include the whole region of the Gulf of Gabes in Tunisia's
territorial sea), caused the Law to be repealed in 1963. In the fishery agreements concluded
by Italy and Tunisia in 1963, 1963 Agreement, supra note 45, and 1971, 1971 Agreement,
id., the region of the Gulf of Gabes was "recognized" by Italy as part of Tunisia's "reserved
fishery zone." The agreement of 1976 only referred to the baselines drawn by Tunisia along
its northern coast, 1976 Agreement, supra note 46, and not to those adopted in the region
of the Gulf of Gabes, which was again regarded as a "reserved fishery zone." Moreover,
the Italian Shipping Ministry Decree of September 25, 1959, GAZ. UFF. ITAL., supra note 15,
considered the Tunisian "reserved fishery zone" beyond the twelve-mile limit as a zone of
high seas.
78. Continental Shelf, supra note 3, at 316-17 (J. Evenson, dissenting). In Judge
Evensen's opinion, the closing line of the Gulf of Gabes should have been regarded as "a
natural continuation of the system of straight baselines drawn outside the Archipelago of
Kerkennah continuing to the Island of Jerba and then on the mainland." Id.
79. Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 503.
80. See supra note 33.
81. Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 503. As previously -discussed, supra note 34,
it is not at all clear how many islands constitute a fringe in terms of Article 4(1) of the 1958
Geneva Convention. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 4(1). It is
a well known fact that the rules of both the 1858 Convention and the 1982 Convention have
been subject to criticism for not laying down exact criteria to determine when the method
of straight baselines may be employed. According to D.P. O'CONNELL. supra note 12, at
208-91, these difficulties could be overcome by considering the "general direction of the
coast" concept as the decisive criterion of when the method may be used, and not as a mere
condition for the lawfulness of each straight baseline. If this view is correct, the possibility
of employing the method of straight baselines in the region of the Gulf of Gabes would be,
generally speaking, incontrovertible. See also supra note 36.
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As far as the closing line of the Gulf of Gabes is concerned,
it can probably be asserted that it does not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, if the
island of J erba and the southernmost of the Kerkennah Islands are
taken as the entrance points, as the 1973 Tunisian Law has done. 82
In addition, when it comes to deciding whether the waters within
the closing line are "sufficiently closely linked to the land domain
to be subject to the regime of internal waters," the particular
natural and historical characteristics of the Gulf of Gabes cannot
be ignored: the close relationship between land and sea, due mainly
to the considerable shallowness of the waters; the existence of
centuries-old sedentary fisheries, which constitute an important
economic resource; and the constant manifestations of state authority for the purpose of regulating the exploitation of these fisheries. 83
These circumstances, although insufficient to classify the Gulf
of Ga bes as an "historic bay," can certainly play an important role
when applying the rather flexible rules on straight baselines. The
same circumstances might also justify the adoption of the closing
line of the Gulf of Gabes as a "particular baseline" in the terms
of Article 4(4) of the Geneva Convention and Article 7(5) of the
Montego Bay Convention. 8' In any case, if the closure of the Gulf
were considered lawful on the basis of the rules on straight
baselines, it would again be necessary to point out that, according
to Article 5(2) of the Geneva Convention and Article 8(2) of the
Montego Bay Convention, innocent passage of foreign vessels would
have to be allowed within the closing line of the Gulf. 85
D. OTHER STRAIGHT BASELINES ADOPTED BY TUNISIA

To conclude the first part of this investigation, the emphasis
will now turn to the other straight baselines adopted by Tunisia
in 1973. Leaving aside the line drawn from Sidi Garus, at the southeastern extremity of Jerba, to Ras Marmor on the mainland, whose
lawfulness seems incontrovertable, the remaining lines are those
drawn around the shoals fringing the Kerkennah Islands. As has
82. See supra note 36.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 96-98.
84. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 4(4); 1982 Convention,
supra note 12, art. 7(5). See also supra note 39.
85. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 5(2); 1982 Convention,
supra note 19, art. 7(5). See supra note 41.
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already been pointed out, these lines have been drawn using a
number of buoys as base points.85•
During the dispute with Libya over the delimitation of their
continental shelfs, Tunisia justified the adoption of the baselines
in question using the same arguments employed to justify the closing line of the Gulf of Gabes. 86 On the one hand, she appealed to the
existence of "historic rights" which allowed her to modify the
juridical regime of the waters in the area; on the other hand, she
called upon the rules of customary international law on the adoption of the straight baseline system. 87 However, the baselines in
question do not seem, at a first glance, to respect existing customary
law. Although, as has already been observed, the possibility of
employing the straight baseline system in this area can probably
be admitted from a general point of view, 88 "it has been held that
the lines drawn around the Kerkennah Islands depart to a considerable extent from the general direction of the coast." 89
If this view is correct, the intimate relationship of the waters
within the baselines with the land domain, a relationship upon which
Tunisia based much of her argument, would not be sufficient to
justify Tunisia's decision. Article 4(2) of the Geneva Convention and
Article 7(3) of the Montego Bay Convention, 90 as well as the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian
85a. According to the 1973 Tunisian Decree, these buoys are:
a) Chebba No. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35°08 40"
11°12 43"
b) Maruka .. . ........ .. ........ . . . . . . . .. ...
35°01 20"
11°29 11
c) El Barani. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34 °55 21"
11°33 09
d) El Mzebla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35°51 '27
11°38 14
e) Sakib Hamida No. 1. . . ... . .. . .. . . .. . . . . ..
34°45 17"
11°33 58
f)
Sakib Hamida No. 2 .. . .. . ... .. . .. . .. .. .. .
34°43 48
11°33 23
g) Oued Bou Zrara No. 1 . . . . ... .. .. .. ... . ...
34°42 36
11°29 03
h) Oued Bou Zrara No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34 °41 '22
11°26 42
i)
Oued Mimoun No. 4 ... . . .. . . .... . .. . . .. ..
34°40 25
11°19 40
j)
Oued Saadoun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34°39 10
11°14'14
k) Samoun . . . . . . .. . . ... . . ..... . .. . ... . . . . . .
34°34 54
11°03 38
86. 1973 Tunisian Decree, supra note 10, art. 1(6). Neither the 1973 Tunisian Decree,
supra note 10, nor the 1973 Tunisian Law, supra note 9, expressly qualify the water areas
within these baselines as internal waters. However, in the Tunisian Counter-Memorial, supra
note 2, at 18, Tunisia made it clear that, "si l'on examine le trace des lignes de base tunisiennes
entre Ras Kapoudia et Ras Es-Samoun on constatera qu'il a precisement pour objet . . . de
rattacher expressement cette partie des les iles et des hauts-fonds aux eux interieures."
87. See Tunisian Counter-Memorial, supra note 55, at 17~ 18 .
88. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
89. See de Guttry, supra note 32.
90. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 4(2); 1982 Convention,
supra note 19, art. 7(3). See supra note 31.
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Fisheries Case,91 all make it quite clear that straight baselines can
in no case depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.
In addition, Article 4(3) of the Geneva Convention and Article
7(4) of the Montego Bay Convention do not admit the use of "lowtide elevations" as base points, unless "lighthouses or similar
installations which are permanently above sea-level have been built
on them," or unless "the drawing of baselines to and from such elevations has received general international recognition." 92 It certainly
cannot be said that the straight baselines drawn around the
Kerkennah Islands have received general recognition on the part
of third states (suffice it to tecall Libya's vehement protest during
the dispute over the continental shelf). 93 Since light buoys were used
as base points for drawing these lines, the problem is then to
establish whether these buoys can be considered as equivalent to
"lighthouses or similar installations" in the terms of the articles
just mentioned. That buoys could be so considered was denied by
Libya in her memorial to the International Court of Justice, which
characterized the base points used by the 1973 Tunisian Decree as
"low-tide elevations the use of which as base-points is prohibited
by law." 94 An entirely different view, however, was expressed by
Judge ad hoc Evensen in his dissenting opinion annexed to the 1982
judgment of the International Court of Justice. 95
91. According to the Tunisian Counter-Memorial, supra note 55, at 17 n.18,
meme si I'article 4 (of the 1958 Geneva Convention) est, dans une certaine measure,
l'expression de la coutume, celle-ci ... a ete, d'abord et avant tout formulee par
la Gour Internationa/,e de Justice elle meme, dans l'affaire anglo-norvegienne des
pecheries. C'est done l'arret de la Cour qui seul permet, aujourd 'hui encore, d'identifier dans ces dispositions conventionelles ou dans les tendances recentes, ce qui
participe de la codification, ou, au contraire, du developpement progressif du droit
international.
It is undoubtedly true, as Tunisia pointed out, that the court insisted on the close relationship of the sea areas within the baselines with the land domain. But it is also true that the
court stressed that "the drawing of baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast." Fisheries Case, supra note 6, at 133.
92. For a detailed analysis of problems regarding the drawing of baselines from lowtide elevations, see M.S. McDOUGAL & W.T. BURKE, supra note 66, at 387.
93. See Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 478.
94. Id. 503-04.
95. Continental Shelf, supra note 3, at 315-16 (J. Evenson, dissenting). According to
Judge Evensen,
light buoys seem to have been positioned on most of these low-tide elevations. In
any event, the stationary fishing gear which has been placed on them in aboundance and which is premanently above sea-level should be taken into consideration in this context. It is further an indisputable fact that new technology has made
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The validity of the baselines in question seems, therefore, to
be the subject of controversy. However, it remains to be seen
whether these baselines can be justified in light of Article 4(4) of
the Geneva Convention and Article 7(5) of the Montego Bay Convention which allow for the drawing of "particular" baselines on
the basis of economic and historical factors. 96 According to Judge
Evensen, "the historic and economic facts of the region concerned
fully meet these requirements." 97 The region of the Kerkennah
Islands is in fact characterized by the presence of a large number
of shoals no more than two to three metres below the surface. These
shoals make the waters totally unsuitable for navigation, and have
allowed for the erection of fishing structures by the local inhabitants
since far-off times. These fisheries fall into the category of so-called
"fixed" or "structural" fisheries since they are erected by driving
piles into the sea-bed. The public authorities initially only sanctioned
and regulated private deeds of possession, but later attempted to
gradually bring the shoals under the regime of state property
("domain public"). It should be added that these manifestations of
state authority, in particular the claim to include the area of the
fixed fisheries in the Tunisian "domain public maritime" irrespective of their distance from the coast- does not seem to have
ever provoked protests by third states. 98
In any case, should the possibility of applying the rules on
straight baselines be denied, it seems that the peculiar natural and
historical characteristics of the region concerned would also allow
for the application of the doctrine of "historic waters." Contrary
to what has been said on the closure of the Gulf of Gabes, which
is only partly included in the region of the fixed fisheries, it would
seem in this case that the claim that this region was state property
was in fact indicative of a claim of full sovereignty. 99 Moreover, it
the installation of light beacons a simple and inexpensible operation; and they can
be installed within hours.

Id.
96. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 4(4); 1982 Convention,
supra note 19, art. 7(5). See supra note 38 and supra text accompanying note 39.
97. Continental Shelf, supra note 3, at 316.
98. See G. GIDEL, supra note l, at 491-92; Francois, supra note 1, at 97; Papandreou, supra
note 1, at 61; F. MOUSSA, supra note l, at 44-45. See also The Tunisian Memorial, supra note
2, at 89-97; Tunisian Reply, supra note 2, at 27.
99. According to the Instructions on Navigation and Sea Fisheries issued by the Tunisian Director of Public Works, para. 28, "la diplomatie maritime considere generalement comme
faisant partie de la mer territoriale d'un pays •. . . les banes exploitables attenant a la cote
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would be excessive to ask for proof of "historic" denial of innocent
passage in order to qualify this area as internal waters, since it
is difficult to see how this right could ever have been exercised
by foreign vessels in such extremely shallow waters. If, therefore,
the lack of protests on the part of third states is considered as
implying acquiescence, it follows that previous to 1973 Tunisia had
acquired full sovereignty over the whole region of the fixed
fisheries. It goes without saying, however, that if the theory of
"historic waters" is to be applied, it should be verified whether the
area over which Tunisia had "historically" acquired sovereignty
effectively corresponds to that included within the baselines adopted
in 1973. 100

III. TUNISIA'S "HISTORIC RIGHTS"
BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA
A.

THE EXCLUSIVE FISHERY ZONE

Having concluded the investigation into recent Tunisian practice relating to claims of full sovereignty over maritime areas, the
emphasis will now turn to Tunisia's claims relating to the exercise
of more limited rights beyond her territorial sea. In this connection, the exclusive fishery zone proclaimed in 1951 must be
examined. Article 3 of the Decree of July 26, 1951, which
reorganized Tunisian legislation on fishery control defined this zone
in the following terms:
Au large des cotes tunisiennes, une zone est reservee dans laquelle
seuls pourront etre autorises a pratiquer la peche les navires
ferme, quelle que soit leur etendue, ... et meme certaines etendues de mer libre dont
l'exploitation par un Etat a ete consacree par l'usage." Instruction sur le Service de Navigation et des Peches Maritimes du 31 Decembre 1904, re-printed in the Tunisian Memorial,
supra note 2, annex 87, at 411. Although these "Instructions" were not free from ambiguity
with regard to the exact legal status of the area of Tunisian sedentary fisheries, they seemed
to distinguish between the region of the fixed fisheries, which did not extend beyond 10
to 12 miles from the coast and which was regarded "comme faisant partie du Domain public
maritime de la Regence," and the much wider region of the sponge fisheries, which was
regarded as an area over which "un usage immemorial reconnu par les principales Puissances,
attribue a la Tunisie l'exploitation et la police des banes d'eponges situes sur le littoral,
meme en dehors de la mer territoriale." Id. annex 87, para. 29 (emphasis added). It would
seem, therefore, that, while this latter region was regarded as an area of high seas, over
which Tunisia had acquired "historic" rights for the purpose of exploiting and regulating
sponge fisheries, the region of the fixed fisheries was in fact included in Tunisia's "territorial
sea."
100. See Y.Z. BLUM, supra note 5, at 238-40.
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battant pavilion fran~ais OU tunisien. La zone de peche reservee
comprend: a) de la frontiere algero-tunisienne au Ras Kapoudia et
autour des Iles adjacentes, la partie de la mer comprise entre la
laisse de basse-mer et une ligne parallele tracee a3 milles au large
a !'exception du golfe de Tunis, qui a l'interieur de la ligne Cap
Farina, Ile Plane, Ile Zembra, Cap Bon, est entierement compris
dans ladite zone; b) du Ras Kapoudia ala frontiere de Tripolitaine,
la partie de la mer limitee par une ligne qui, partant du point
d'aboutissement de la ligne de 3 milles decrite ci-dessus, rejoint
sur le parallele du Ras Kapoudia l'isobathe de 50 metres et sui cette
isobathe jusqu'a son point de recontre avec une ·ugne partant u
Ras-Ajdir en direction du Nord-Est ZV-45 °. 101
It should be noted that the area described under "a," after having been
extended to twelve miles from the low-water mark by Law No. 62-35
(1962) and Law No. 63-49(1963), 102 is now totally included in Tunisia's
internal waters. 103 Thus, it might be concluded that this part of Article
3 of the 1951 Decree is no longer in force-a fact which also transpires
from Article 7 of Law No. 73-49 (1973) on the territorial sea. 104
On the other hand, the area described under "b" is today only
partly included in Tunisia's internal waters and territorial sea. This
explains why the 1973 Law specifies in Article 5 that: "Demeurent
d'application les dispositions de l'alinea b) de l'article 3 du decret
du 26 juillet 1951 modifie par la loi n. 63-49 du 30 decembre 1963
et relatif ala zone reservee, en matiere de peche, aux seuls navires
tunisiens." 105 The reservation of the exclusive right for Tunisian
vessels to fish in the zone had been effected by the Laws of 1962
and 1963, after Tunisia had become independent. 106
101. 1951 Tunisian Decree, supa note 42, art. 3.
102. Law No. 62-35, supa note 43; Law No. 63-49, supra note 44.
103. See supa text accompanying notes 9-49.
104. According to the 1973 Tunisian Law, art. 7: "Soot abrogees toutes dispositions
contraires a la presente loi et notamment celles du paragraphe premier de l'article 3 du
decret du 26 juillet 1951 tel que modifie par la loi n° 63-49 du 30 decembre 1963." 1973 Tunisian Law, supra note 9, art. 7.
105. Id. art. 5.
106. As previously discussed, the 1962 Tunisian Law, supa note 43, attempted to include
the whole area of the Gulf of Gabes in Tunisia's "territorial sea." See supa note 72. Because
of protest from Italy, the Law was repealed by the 1963 Tunisian Law, supra note 44. Articles
1 & 3 of the 1963 Law read as follows:
Article premier. L'article 3 du decret du 26 juillet 1951 (22 Chaoual 1370) portant
refonte de la legislation de la police de la peche tel qu'il ete modifie par la loi n°
62-35 du 16 octobre 1962 (18 Joumada 1382) est abroge et remplace par les dispositions suivantes:
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The creation of the exclusive fishery zone in 1951 was part of
a well-known process which aimed at extending the rights of coastal
states to fisheries beyond the external limit of their territorial sea.
This process culminated in the affirmation of the so-called "Exclusive Economic Zone" by the Montego Bay Convention in 1982.107
Tunisia herself has recognized, with specific reference to the 1963
Law, that the creation of her exclusive fishery zone, "se situe dans
la ligne de I' evolution qui conduit aujourd'hui la Illeme Conference
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer a pron er la constitution
de 'zones ecorwmique exclusives' en bordure du litoral des puissances
cotieres." 108
It must be pointed out, however, that not all legal writers are
in agreement over the question of the "exclusive economic zone,"
as described in the 1982 Convention, being already part of
customary international law. According to one view, the exclusive
economic zone should be considered, from the point of view of
customary international law, as a series of rights of the coastal state,
each of which has its own history and a different degree of general
acceptance. 109 In addition, one should note the fact that, as some

"Article 3 (nouveau). Est denommee mer territoriale tunisienne: de la frontiere
tuniso-algerienne a la frontiere tuniso-libyenne et autour des iles adjacentes, la
partie de la mer comprise entre la laisse de basse mer et une ligne parallele tracee
a 6 milles au large a l'exception du golfe de Tunis qui a l'interieur de la ligne cap
Farina, ile Plane, ile Zembra et cap Bon, est entierement compris dans ladite mer.
Une zone contigue a la mer territoriale tunisienne telle qu'elle est definie
ci-dessus est reservee dans laquelle seuls les naviers battant pavilion tunisien pourront etre autorises a pratiquer la peche.
Cette zone est definie:
a) de la frontiere tuniso-algerienne a Ras Kapoudia par la partie de la mer
comprise entre la ligne des 6 milles et celle des 12 milles marins mesures a partir
de la laisse de basse mer:
b) de Ras Kapoudia a la frontiere tuniso-libyenne: par la partie de la mer limitee
par une ligne qui partant du point d'aboutissement de la ligne des 12 milles marins
mentionnes au paragraphe a) ci-dessus rejoint sur le parallele de Ras Kapoudia
l'isobathe de 50 metres et suit cette isobathe jusqu'a son point de rencontre avec une ligne partant de Ras Ajdir en direction du nord-est ZV 45°."
1963 Tunisian Law, supra note 44, arts. 1 & 3.
107. 1982 Convention, supra note 12, art. 55. On the E.E.Z. see Queneduc, La Zone
Economique, 79 R. G. DR. INT. P. 321 (1975); Phillips, The Exclusive Economic Zone as a Concept in International Law, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585 (1977); D.P. O'CONNELL. supra note 12,
at 533; B. CONFORTI, LA ZONA ECONOMICA ESCLUSIVA (1983).
108. Tunisian Counter-Memorial, supra note 55, at 16.
109. See T. TREVES, LA CONVENZIONE DELLE NAZIONI UNITE SUL DIRITTO DEL MARE 26
(1983).
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writers have already pointed out, the bathymetric criterion used
by Tunisia to delimit her exclusive fishery zone does not seem to
conform to state practice.110 The Montego Bay Convention itself has
adopted a spatial criterion for delimiting the exclusive economic
zone, by imposing the maximum limit of 200 nautical miles from
the baselines of the territorial sea. 111
Finally, any discussion on the lawfulness of Tunisia's fishery
zone cannot ignore the close proximity of islands belonging to Italy
and, more generally, the presence of other states facing, or adjacent
to, the eastern coast of Tunisia. This raises complicated problems
over the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones belonging to
each of the states concerned. According to Article 4(1) of the
Montego Bay Convention,
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to
achieve an equitable solution.

So far, Tunisia has not proclaimed an "exclusive economic zone"
strictly speaking, nor has she concluded any agreement with the
interested states aimed at delimiting their respective exclusive
economic zones. It has been persuasively held that, in the absence
of a delimitation agreement, none of the opposite or adjacent states
can claim, vis-d-vis the others, exclusive authority over the areas
in which the respective economic zones overlap or are, in any case,
in dispute. 112
All these factors make it necessary to ascertain whether the
Tunisian fishery zone can at present be justified on the basis of
an historic title and, in any case, to analyze the attitude of the other
states concerned towards Tunisia's claim. An investigation of this
kind is justified by the fact that, as we have already seen, Tunisia
has for a long time exercised sovereign rights over fisheries in the
region of the Gulf of Gabes. 113 The exact nature and extent of those
rights must now be examined.

110.
111.
112.
113.

See Scovazzi, supra note 45, at 743-44.
1982 Convention, supra note 12, art. 57.
B. CONFORTI. supra note 107, at 9-11.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-100.
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B. TUNISIA'S "HISTORIC RIGHTS" OVER SEDENTARY FISHERIES

In order to ascertain the exact nature and extent of the
"historic rights" claimed by Tunisia, it seems convenient to start
from the detailed description given by Tunisia herself during the
dispute with Libya over the delimitation of the continental shelf. 114
According to this description, Tunisia's "historic rights" essentially
concerned the exploitation of those fisheries commonly known as
"sedentary fisheries." When describing these fisheries, Tunisia has
referred to a distinction widely used by legal writers: on the one
hand, she referred to fisheries for the capture of mobile species
depending on installations fixed on the sea-bed (the so-called "fixed"
or "structural" fisheries); on the other, she also mentioned fisheries
of "sedentary" species, such as sponge fisheries. 115
Tunisia's rights over the "fixed" fisheries have already been
mentioned in connection with the straight baselines drawn in the
region of the Kerkennah Islands. It seems, however, that these
rights cannot be relevant when discussing Tunisia's claims to
sovereign rights beyond the territorial sea. Although Tunisia claims
exclusive jurisdiction over the "fixed fisheries" whatever their
distance from the coast, it must be pointed out that in fact these
fisheries do not extend beyond ten to twelve miles from the coast
and are today entirely included in Tunisia's territorial sea or internal
waters. 116
The same cannot be said of Tunisia's rights over the sponge
fisheries, which extend over a much wider area than that of the
"fixed" fisheries and which Tunisia has considered for a long time
114. See Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, at 73.
115. Id. at 88. On the well-known distinction between "fixed" or "structural" fisheries
and fisheries of sedentary species, see G. GIDEL, supra note l, at 448; Papandreou, supra note
1, at 4-5; Y.Z. BLUM, supra note 5, at 331.
116. See Instructions on Navigation and Sea Fisheries, supra note 99, para. 29; G.
GIDEL. supra note l, at 491. According to Francois, supra note 1, at 97, however, the fixed
fisheries would extend up to 17 miles from the coast. In this sense, see also D.P. O'CONNELL,
supra note 12, at 451-52. Be that as it may, it must be stressed that these fisheries are
nowadays entirely included in Tunisia's territorial sea or internal waters as a consequence
of the straight baselines adopted in 1973. As Gidel correctly pointed out,
"la question des pecheries sedentaires ne souleve de difficultes que si ces pecheries
se trouvant au dela de la limite exterieure des eaux territoriales. Pour autant
qu'elles sont situees a l'interieur de cette limite les mesures prises a leur egard
par l'Etat riverain sont l'exercice pur et simple des droits qui lui appartiennent
sur la mer territoriale."
G. GIDEL. supra note 1, at 489.
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as subject to her exclusive jurisdiction. At least from the 19th century, the Beys of Tunis asserted a right to control and license the
exploitation of the sponge beds in the whole area of the Gulf of
Gabes. They conceded the exploitation of these fisheries both to
their own nationals and to foreigners as a way of increasing their
revenues. Several writers have quoted the concession granted in
1836 to a Greek merchant named Cotulma to work the sponge beds
between Souza and J erba. Following this, in 1846, the Bey granted
the concession to his minister Ben Ayed, and the previous concession to the merchant Cotulma was revoked. Finally, in 1869 a decision was made to farm out the exploitation of the sponge beds,
declaring the revenue therefrom to be state revenue and not, as
it had been, part of the Bey's private income. 117 A series of decrees
was then issued by Tunisia to regulate sponge fishing by nationals
and foreigners. At the same time octopus fishing was regulated.
One could mention the decrees issued in 1906, as examples of
Tunisian legislation on sedentary fisheries. Article 1 of the Decree
of July 17, 1906 defined sponge fishing as being "libre sur toute
l'entendue des banes tunisiens aux conditions et charges ci-apres." 118
This Decree obliged all sponge fishers to take out a license, which
would be granted _on payment of certain taxes. At the same time,
the boats used for sponge fishing were rendered liable to inspection by Tunisian agents and penalties were introduced for anyone
contravening the provisions of the Decree. 119 The Decree of July 16,
1906 on octopus fishing abolished the use of fishing licenses and
declared the fishing and selling of octopus "free" on condition that
certain sums of money be paid. 120
A precise delimitation of the zone within which Tunisia claimed
sovereign rights for the exploitation of sponge and octopus fisheries
was effected for the first time by the "Instructions on Navigation
and Sea Fisheries" issued by the Tunisian Director of Public Works
on December 31, 1904. Paragraph 64 of the Instructions delimited
the "zone of surveillance" within which the Tunisia,p authorities
could exercise their control of fishing activities in the following
terms:
117. On Tunisian sponge fisheries, See G. GIGEL, supra note l, 492-93; Fran~ois, supra
note 1, at 97; Papandreou, supra note 1, at 61.
118. Decree of July 17, 1906, Journal officiel de la Republique Tunisienne 751, art. 1
(1906). The Decree is reprinted in Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, annex 87, at 411.
119. Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, annex 87, at arts. 2, 14.
120. Decree of July 16, 1906, supra note 118, arts. 2 & 3. Tunisian Memorial, supra note
2, annex 87, at 411.
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Instruction pour le Service des chaloupes gardes-peche chargees de
la surveillance doe la Peches des Eponges et des Poulpes. 62. - Les
gardes-peche ... sont affectes a la surveillance de la peche dans
la partie de mer delimitee: 1° Du cote de terre, par le rivage, depuis
le cap Africa jusqu'a la frontiere tripolitaine; 2° Du cote du large,
par la ligne des fonds de 50 metres jusqu'a sa recontre: Au Nord,
avec une ligne Est et Ouest partant du cap Africa; Au Sud, avec
une ligne partant du ras Ashdir et se dirigeant vers le Nord-Est. 121

The 1904 Instructions thus adopted for the first time the fifty-metre
isobath limit, which was later to be used in the 1951 Decree and
in the 1963 Law as the seaward limit of Tunisia's exclusive fishery
zone. The choice of the fifty-metre isobath was advocated mainly
to simplify surveillance. In fact, on the one hand, the techniques
in use at the time did not allow the exploitation of the sponge beds
beyond this limit; on the other, the choice of a bathymetric criterion
would make it easier, by the use of soundings, to determine when
the "zone of surveillance" had effectively been violated by
fishermen. 122
With regard to this delimitation, it must be pointed out that
Tunisia, in her 1981 memorial to the International Court of Justice,
asserted that the adoption of the fifty-metre isobath limit in 1904
was of a merely provisional nature and could not imply renunciation of rights previously acquired over all the "Tunisian" sponge
beds, even when these were situated beyond the fifty-metre
isobath. 123 Nevertheless, it seems that the international prominence
of the delimitation effected in 1904 could not be invalidated by such
an assertion. From that date on, in fact, the fifty-metre isobath
marked the limit within which Tunisia intended effectively to exercise sovereign rights on sedentary fisheries.
Third states on the whole adopted a favorable attitude towards
Tunisia's claims. In fact, the various rules and regulations issued
by Tunisia before 1951 on sponge and octopus fishing did not meet
with any protest from other states. On the contrary, several writers
121. Instructions on Navigation and Sea Fisheries, supra note 99, para. 62, at 325.
122. Id. para. 29. See also Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, annex 80.
123. According to the Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, at 99, "la Tunisie a etendu tres
loin vers l'est ses activites de peche pour couvrir des espaces maritimes tres eloignes des
cotes et atteignant en certains endroits des profondeurs de pres de 100 metres." As a consequence, the choice of the 50-metre isobath by the 1904 "Instructions," Instruction on Navigation and Sea Fisheries, supra note 99, "n'equivalait pas pour autant a une renonciation de
souverainete sur des espaces situes au-dela de l'isobathe de 50 m.", since "!'Administration
territoriale considerait cette limite comme etant une frontiere provisoire." Id. at 102.
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have even quoted some episodes, which seem clearly to denote
acquiescence of third states. For example, the concession granted
to the Bey's minister Ben Ayed in 1846 was effected through
Beylical decrees notified to foreign consuls, without any official protest being raised despite representations from the Greek merchant
Cotulma, whose concession had been revoked. 1:u In addition, according to many writers, the Bey's exclusive jurisdiction over sponge
and octopus fishing was implicitly recognized by a convention concluded on March 23, 1870, between the government of the Bey and
its French, English, and Italian creditors, who were represented
by their respective governments. On the basis of this convention,
the Tunisian government's debt was to be reduced in exchange for
various revenues to be ceded by the Bey; among these were
revenues deriving from the exploitation of sponge and octopus
fishing. 125 An episode which took place in 1875 is also of interest
in this respect: a Greek captain and a French merchant attempted
to protest over the system of allocation of the sponge beds by
invoking the principle of the freedom of the high seas, but their
protests met with no support from their consuls. 126
Even Libya, during the dispute with Tunisia over the continental shelf, acknowledged that, "Evidence of the general recognition of Tunisian proprietary rights and ancillary rights to protection and control over the sedentary species asserted is not in issue.
For the fact is that such rights existed." 121 However, Libya pointed
out that before 1951 Tunisia's rights over sedentary fisheries had
never purported to exclude foreigners from the exploitation of these
fisheries. 128 In addition, she disputed the exact geographical extent
of Tunisia's "historic rights," asserting that, "the sedentary species,
on which the claim to historic rights depends, were never fished
throughout the maritime zone now claimed by Tunisia." 129
124. See G. GIDEL. supra note l, at 492; Francois, supra note l, at 97; Papandreou, supra
note 1, at 61-62. See also the Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, at 99-100.
125. See G. GIDEL, supra note l, at 492 n.2; Papandreou, supra note l, at 62; L.J. BoucHEZ.
supra note l, at 222; F. LAURIA. supra note l, at 171. The text of the 1870 Convention appears
in J. DE CLERG & A. DE CLERG, 15 RECUEIL DES TRAITES DE LA FRANCE 540 (Supp.1888). A copy
of this page is reprinted in the Libyan Counter Memorial, supra note 2, annex 32.
126. See G. GIDEL. supra note 1, at 492; Francois, supra note l, at 97; Papandreou, supra,
note l, at 62; L.J. BouCHEZ. supra note l, at 222; D.P. O'CONNELL. supra note 12, at 452.
127. See the Libyan Counter-Memorial, supra note 2, at 53.
128. Id. at 44.
129. Id. at 42-44.
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There is no doubt that the first assertion is correct. The above
discussion has demonstrated that the claim to the right to exclude
foreign fishermen from the exploitation of the natural resources
of the sea was only advanced in 1951. Before that date, Tunisia had
simply claimed sovereign rights for the limited purpose of regulating
sponge and octopus fishing, mainly as a means of increasing her
revenues. These rights did not exclude the activity of foreigners
in the area, although they had to conform to the rules laid down
by the territorial sovereign. This fact has also been underlined by
all the writers who have examined the Tunisian fisheries from a
legal point of view .130
As far as the exact geographical extent of the Tunisian rights
is concerned, it must be admitted that it would be difficult to ascertain up to what limit sponge and octopus fishing was actually carried
out. As for the attitude of third states, the best authorities have
it that the 1904 Instructions adopting the fifty-metres isobath limit
received wide notoriety without ever raising objections.131 However
it would seem that this assertion could not be accepted without some
reservations. In fact, it can be seen from the documentation annexed
to Libya's 1981 reply to the International Court of Justice that in
1911 Italy challenged Tunisia's unilateral delimitation of her "zone
of surveillance."
The dispute arose after the capture of the Italian vessels
"Torino" and "Unione" by Tunisian agents while fishing for sponges
off the Kerkennah Islands without being in possession of the
required license. An aide-memoire sent to the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs from the Italian government on May 3, 1911,
asserted that Tunisia's rights beyond the three-mile limit of her
territorial sea had been claimed on the mere basis of "decrets,
arretes, etc.... , actes unilateraux d'administration interieure
n'engageant que la partie que les a emis, et ne pouvant meme pas,
par reconnaissance tacite, constituer un rapport juridique d'obligation internationale." 132 From a further letter sent on May 15, 1911,
from the French Resident-General at Tunis to the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs, it is evident that already in 1900 and 1903 the
1

130. See G. GIDEL, supra note l, at 493; Francois, supra note l, at 97; Papandreou, supra
note l, at 63, 99.
131. Francois, supra note l, at 97; Papandreou, supra note 1, at 63.
132. Aide-Memoire Italien au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres en date du 3 Mai 1911,
reprinted in Libyan Reply, supra note 2, annex 1-15.
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question of the area over which the Tunisian Regency claimed
"historic rights" had been the object of a correspondence between
the French and the Italian governments. The Resident-General had
proposed the adoption of the fifty-metre isobath as a limit to this
area, but the Italian government replied that it would find the choice
of the thirty-metre isobath preferable. 133
In any case, the conclusion to be drawn at this point is that
before 1951 Tunisia had acquired sovereign rights for the limited
purpose of regulating sponge and octopus fisheries over an area
of sea adjacent to her south-eastern coast. 134 These rights were
acquired through effective manifestations of state authority and
the acquiescence of third states. 135 However, as to the exact
geographical extent of Tunisia's "historic rights," it seems necessary
to adopt a more cautious attitude, since Tunisia's unilateral delimitation of her "zone of surveillance" seems to have been the subject
of controversy.
133. Lettre du Resident General a Tunis au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres en date
du 15 Mai 1911, reprinted in Libyan Reply, supra note 2, at annex I-15. The matter was
finally settled by an attempt at creating an arbitration commission. However, the commission never met and the ltalo/Libyan war prevented the matter from being taken any further. See Sovereignty, Frontiers and the Historical Background, Libyan Counter Memorial,
supra note 2, annex 6, at 53-54.
134. Tunisia's rights to sponge fisheries have been recognized by many legal writers.
In addition to those quoted supra note 18, see also Hurst, Whose is the Bed of the Sea.?, 4
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 41 (1923-1924); F. DURANTE, LA PIATTAFORMA LITORALE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 30 (1955); G. p ALLIERI, supra note 17' at 44 7-48; L. CA vARE, supra note 17' at 639;
T. SCOAVZZI, supra note 38, at 15-16, 173; D. P. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 451-52.
135. The above analysis has been conducted on the basis of the doctrine of "historic
rights" as referred to in this paper. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8. Tunisia's rights
to sponge fisheries have therefore been treated as rights acquired in derogation of the normally applicable rules of international law. It must be pointed out, however, that the nature
of the coastal state's rights to sedentary fisheries has been the subject of controversy for
a long time. As is well known, many writers have explained these rights as rights acquired
pursuant to the law, rather than in derogation of it. Certain writers have invoked the doctrine of "occupation," since they would regard the sea-bed as terra nullius and rights to
sedentary fisheries as sovereign rights over the sea-bed. See, e.g., D.P. O'CoNN~LL, supra
note 12, at 450. Others have relied on the formation of a rule of customary international
law, which would safeguard the coastal state's interests to sedentary fisheries without imposing spacial limits to its jurisdiction. See, e.g., T. ScovAZZI. supra note 38, at 171. A detailed
analysis of the nature of the coastal state's rights to sedentary fisheries would clearly go
beyond the scope of this investigation. Let it be added that, according to Y.Z. BLUM, supra
note 5, "whatever the juridical basis of exclusive State claims to sedentary fisheries on the
high seas, it would appear that the process of formation of these rights is, in fact, identical
with that observed in the emergence of historic rights in general, namely, assertion of exclusive State authority, on the one hand, and acquiescence in such exclus~ve authority, on
the other hand." Id. at 332.
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"HISTORIC RIGHTS" OVER SEDENTARY FISHERIES AND
TUNISIA'S "EXCLUSIVE FISHERY ZONE"

Having thus examined the nature and extent of the "historic
rights" claimed by Tunisia, it remains to be seen what relevance
these rights may have in establishing the international validity of
Tunisia's "exclusive fishery zone." It is this author's opinion that
the creation of the fishery zone in 1951 could not have been justified
on the sole basis of the "historic rights" previously acquired by
Tunisia. Apart from the question of whether other states had in
fact accepted Tunisia's unilaterial delimitation of her own "historic
rights," it should be recalled that those rights only related to
surveillance and control over sponge and octopus fisheries. Given
this, it must be admitted that the 1951 Decree effectively put forward a completely new and different claim.
In one respect, if the content of Tunisia's "historic rights" is
considered, it must be stressed that those rights did not exclude
foreigners from the exploitation of sponge and octopus fisheries,
whereas the 1951 Decree established, for the first time, an
"exclusive fishery zone," initially reserved to Tunisian and French
vessels and successfully restricted to Tunisian vessels only .136
In addition, it must be pointed out that Tunisia's "historic
rights" only related to sponge and octopus fishing, whereas the 1951
Decree, while retaining the fifty-metre isobath as the seaward limit
of Tunisian jurisdiction, claimed for the first time a reserved zone
relating to all biological resources of the sea. 137 It may be added
that an historical analysis seems to confirm our reservations as to
the adoption of the bathymetric criterion itself. It has been shown
that the fifty-metre isobath was adopted for the first time in 1904
for practical and economic reasons strictly related to the sedentary
character of the species over which Tunisia claimed exclusive
jurisdiction at that time. It does not seem, however, that those same
136. Tunisia herself has recognized that, "[apors que l'Instruction du 31 decembre 1904
instituait ... une zone de surveillance, le decret de 1951 a etabli pour la premiere fois, une
zone de peche reservee dans laquelle seuls pourront etre autorises a pratiquer la peche les
navires battant pavilion franc;ais ou tunisien." Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, at 103
(emphasis added).
137. This circumstance was clearly pointed out by T. Scov AZZI. supra note 135, at 16.
It may be added that, whatever the nature of the coastal state's rights to sedentary fisheries,
see supra note 136, these rights do not per se affect the status of the superadjacent waters.
See, e.g., Papandreou, supra note 1.
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practical and economic reasons could justify the retention of the
bathymetric criterion for the purpose of delimiting a reserved zone
in which sovereign rights are claimed over all biological resources,
whether sedentary or not.
If, therefore, Tunisia's "historic rights" could not per se justify
the creation of the "exclusive fishery zone," it seems necessary to
analyze the attitude of third states after 1951, when for the first
time Tunisia claimed the right to exclude foreigners from fishing
in the area within the fifty-metre isobath. In this respect we shall
confine ourselves to a few brief observations, since only a few of
the most closely affected states have taken a stance over the creation of Tunisia's reserved zone.
Italy seems to have taken a favorable attitude towards
Tunisia's claim in the fishery agreements she concluded with Tunisia
in 1963, 1971 and 1976, in which express mention was made of
Tunisia's "exclusive fishery zone." Article l(b) of the fishery agreement signed on February 1, 1963,138 stated that:
Le Gouvernement de la Republique Italienne reconnait que la zone
de peche reservee aux navires battant pavilion tunisien est definie
comme suit: ... b) de Ras Kapoudia alafrontiere tuniso-libyenne:
la partie de mer limitee par une ligne qui, partant du point
d'aboutissement de la ligne de douze milles mentionnee ci-dessous,
rejoint, sur le parallele de Ras Kapoudia, l'isobathe de cinquante
metres et suit cette isobathe jusqu'a son point de rencontre avec
une ligne partant de Ras Aghdir en direction du Nord-Est-ZV = 45°.

Article l(b) of the fishery agreement signed on August 20,
1971,139 repeated Italy's "recognition" in the same terms as those
of the 1963 agreement. Finally, Article 12 of the fishery agreement
concluded on June 19, 1976, again mentioned the Tunisian reserved
zone, "que le Gouvernement Italien reconnait comme zone de peche
reservee aUX SeUlS navireS tunisiens." 1' 0
138. See 1963 Agreement, supra note 45.
139. Id.
140. 1976 Agreement, supra note 46, art. 12. It is not clear why Article 12 of the 1976
Agreement, id., as well as Article 13, id. art. 13, common to the agreements of 1963, supra
note 45, and 1971, id., accorded "le passage inoffensif, c'est-a-dire sans peche" to Italian fishingboats in Tunisia's "zone de peche reservee," since the concept of innocent passage is properly
confined to territorial waters. Italy, however, has always regarded this zone as an area of
high seas. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74. By improperly using the term "innocent passage," the articles just mentioned probably purported to make it clear that even
fishing boats had a right to navigate within Tunisia's reserved fishery zone, provided they
did not fish.
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None of these arguments continues in force. The 1976 agreement terminated in 1979 and has not been replaced by any further
bilateral treaty, since the conclusion of fishery agreements with
non-member states comes today within the exclusive competence
of the European Economic Community. 141 This circumstance could
be of importance in deciding whether Tunisia's "exclusive fishery
zone" is at present opposable to Italy, in the absence of an agreement on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones. It has
in fact been held that the conclusion of the said agreements should
not be interpreted to imply Italy's acquiescence to Tunisia's claim.
According to this view, Italy's "recognition" of Tunisia's reserved
zone was only accorded with a view to obtaining the right for Italian
fishermen to fish within certain sea areas along the coasts of Tunisia.
As a consequence of the termination of these governments' agreement, Italy's acceptance of Tunisia's reserved zone should be considered as no longer effective. 142
It will not be possible here to discuss the complex issues connected with the value and forms of recognition and acquiescence
in international law. Suffice it to confine the discussion to mentioning two recent examples of contemporary Italian practice which
seems to be a cautious confirmation of Italy's favorable attitude
towards Tunisia's claim. The already mentioned Shipping Ministry
Decree of September 25, 1979, although defining the zone claimed
by Tunisia as an area of high seas, has prohibited Italian nationals
and vessels flying the Italian flag from fishing in the zone, which
is "traditionally recognized as a zone of fish re-stocking." 143 A statement made by the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs during a parliamentary debate on October 16, 1979, can also be quoted
in this connection: Mr. Zamberletti declared, inter alia, that the
Tunisian fishery zone is "recognized by Italy as a fishing reserve
that Tunisia has assigned for repopulation." 144
Turning now to the attitude of the European Communities, we
should consider a statement made in 1979 before the European
Parliament by Mr. Cheysson, then member of the Commission.
Referring to the Tunisian government's refusal to conclude any further fishery agreements with other countries, Cheysson declared,
141.
142.
143.
144.
ITALIAN

See 5 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1980-81).
Scovazzi, supra note 45, at 738.
See supra note 15.
Statement of Mr. Zamberletti, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, 5
Y.B. INT'L L. 309 (1980-81).
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inter alia, that Tunisia had the right to refuse fishing concessions
to fishermen of all foreign countries. It would not seem, however,
that this statement could be considered as indicative of the EEC
recognition of Tunisia's reserved zone. The circumstances under
which Cheysson's statement was made seem to indicate that he was
in fact referring to the sea area within the twelve-mile limit of
Tunisia's territorial waters.1'5
Among the states which have adopted a negative attitude
towards Tunisia's claim, first place is taken by Libya. Actually, it
does not seem that Libya had ever openly opposed the creation of
Tunisia's "exclusive fishery zone" before the dispute over the continental shelf arose. In her memorial to the International Court of
Justice, however, Libya asserted that she had never acquiesced in
Tunisia's claim. With specific reference to Tunisian Law No. 63-49
(1963), she stated, inter alia, that "The validity in international law
of this type of attempt to create a contiguous exclusive fishery zone
was questionable, and was not admitted by Libya." 146 In addition,
Libya also challenged the lateral delimitation of the reserved zone
unilaterally effected by Tunisia. 147 This last point seems to deserve
closer examination, since the International Court of Justice referred
to it in its judgment of February 24, 1982.
As already discussed, Tunisia had unilaterally adopted the 45°
ZV (Zenith Vertical) line North-East, starting from Ras Ajdir, as
the eastern limit of her "exclusive fishery zone." This line, which
was first expressly mentioned in the 1951 Decree and then confirmed by subsequent Tunisian legislation, was found by the International Court of Justice not to be opposable to Libya, "even as
a mere inchoate maritime boundary between the two countries." 148
Having stressed, from a general point of view, that no state may
unilaterally establish international maritime boundary lines, the
Court rightly observed that the line adopted by Tunisia "originally
intended only as the limit of an area of surveillance in the context
of specific fishery regulations, constitutes a unilateral claim, but
was never a line plotted for the purpose of lateral maritime delimitation, either in the seas or in the continental shelf." 1' 9 The Court found
145. See 22 0. J . Eua. COMM. (No. 245) 228-30, 232-33 (1979).
146. Libyan Memorial, supra note 2, at 476.
147. See Libyan Counter-Memorial, supra note 2, at 55-62; Libyan Reply, supra note
49, at 20-25.
148. Continental Shelf, supra note 3, at 68.
149. Id.
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instead that the line perpendicular to the coast was the only lateral
boundary opposable to Libya of the area claimed by Tunisia as subject to "historic rights." This line had apparently been proposed
by Italy, who at that time exercised sovereignty over Tripolitania,
in 1914, and had been tacitly accepted by the authorities of the
neighboring French Protectorate as a de facto boundary between
the fishery zones claimed by the two colonial powers. 150
Without discussing in detail the precise legal status the Court
attributed to the line perpendicular to the coast, 151 it should be
stressed that the fact this line has been found to be opposable to
Libya does not per se imply that Libya is in any way bound to
respect the reserved fishery zone created by Tunisia in 1951. In
fact, the tacit compromise reached by France and Italy in 1914 only
related to exclusive jurisdiction over sponge fisheries; whereas, as
already discussed, the creation of Tunisia's "exclusive fishery zone"
amounted to a qualitatively and quantitatively new claim which
could not be based on the rights previously acquired over sedentary fisheries.
D.

"HISTORIC RIGHTS" AND TUNISIA'S CONTINENTAL SHELF
AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

To close this part of the investigation, some brief comments
will be made on the possible relevance of Tunisia's "historic rights"
for the purpose of delimiting her continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone. During the dispute with Libya over the continental shelf, Tunisia claimed that the delimitation of the continental
shelf between herself and Libya must not encroach at any point
150. Id. at 70.
151. According to the Court:
the evidence of the existence of such a modus vivendi, resting only on the silence
and lack of protest on the side of the French authorities responsible for the external relations of Tunisia, falls short of proving the existence of a recognized maritime
boundary between the two Parties ... But in view of the absence of agreed and
clearly specified maritime boundaries, the respect for the tacit modus irivendi, which
was never formally contested by either side throughout a long period of time, could
warrant its acceptance as a historical justification for the choice of the method
for the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two States, to the extent
that the historic rights claimed by Tunisia could not in any event be opposable to
Libya east of the modus vivendi line.
Continental Shelf, supra note 3, 70-71. Later the Court added that the line perpendicular
to the coast "is the only lateral boundary opposable to Libya of the area claimed by Tunisia
as subject to historic rights" Id. at 86. These passages were persuasively criticized in the
separate opinion of Judge Ago. Id. at 95.
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upon the area within which she possessed "historic rights." According to Tunisia, "Dans le cas des droits historiques sur les pecheries
sedentaires, l'Etat acquiert des droits souverains sur le fond de la
mer." 152 As a consequence, "[d]e tels droits historiques ne peuvent
etre ignores ou remis en cause dans la delimitation des zones de
plateau continental ou ils s'exercent." 153 In other words, as the
International Court of Justice observed, Tunisia tried to draw a
parallel between the modern recognition of the rights of coastal
states over the continental shelf, and the asserted recognition by
third states of her rights over banks and shoals off her coasts, which
were capable of being exploited centuries before the continental
shelf became of economic and legal significance. 154
At the same time, Tunisia stressed the importance of her
"historic rights" with a view to the future delimitation of her
exclusive economic zone. In this respect, she observed, on the one
hand, that the new Law of the Sea includes the area of her "historic
rights" in the exclusive economic zone. 155 On the other hand,
however, she added that this circumstance "ne saurait avoir pour
consequence d'amputer la Tunisie des droits qu'elle a acquis par
un exercice immemorial et qu'elle a conserves en depit du regime
de haute mer qui s'appliquait, en principe, au dela des trois milles." 156
Libya made no statement regarding the relevance of "historic
rights" for the purpose of delimiting the exclusive economic zone,
but challenged Tunisia's contention that her "historic rights" over
sedentary fisheries could be equated to sovereign rights over the
continental shelf. In the first place, Libya questioned the nature
and extent of Tunisia's "historic rights" asserting that they did not
amount to sovereignty over the sea-bed and that they had never
been exercised throughout the area claimed by Tunisia. 157 In addition, she stressed that these rights could not "deprive a neighboring State of a shelf area which, according to the law, appertains
to it de jure and ab initio." 158
It is a well-known fact that the 1982 judgment of the International Court of Justice avoided the question of whether Tunisia's
"historic rights" were relevant for the purpose of delimiting her
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Tunisian Memorial, supra note 2, at 75.
Id. at 110-11.
Continental Shelf, supra note 2, at 72.
See Tunisian Reply, supra note 55, at 29.
Id.
See supra notes 129-30.
Libyan Reply, supra note 2, at 20. See, Libyan Counter-Memorial, supra note 2, at 73.
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continental shelf. The reason given for this was that the actual
delimitation arrived at was such that it would leave Tunisia in the
full and undisturbed exercise of her "historic rights," whatever they
may be." 159 However, the Court did make some important remarks
which could throw some light on the matter. In the first place, the
Court observed, from a general point of view, that "historic rights"
must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by
long usage. 160 However, in the specific case of the delimitation of
the continental shelf, the Court seems to have denied the relevance
of any existing "historic rights," since "basically, the notion of
historic rights or waters and that of the continental shelf are
governed by distinct legal regimes in customary international law.
The first regime is based on acquisition and occupation, while the
second is based on the existence of rights 'ipso facto' and 'ab
initio'." 161 According to the Court, therefore, Tunisia's "historic
rights" would perhaps have been relevant for the purpose of
delimiting her exclusive economic zone, but not for the purpose of
delimiting her continental shelf. 162
In fact, it seems difficult to agree with Tunisia's assertion
according to which the mere evidence of her "historic rights" over
sedentary fisheries would be a sufficient basis on which to delimit
her continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. With regard to
the continental shelf, Tunisia's claim could only be justified if it were
first proved that her "historic rights" actually amounted to
sovereign rights over the sea-bed. 163 Secondly, it would have to be
verified whether these "historic rights" could survive the establishment of the customary rules on the continental shelf. According
to one view, the continental shelf doctrine of "inherency" should
be viewed as deliberately aimed against the operation of any
159. Continental Shelf, supra note 2, at 77.
160. Id. at 73.
161. Id. at 74.
162. Id. "While it may be that Tunisia's historic rights and titles are more nearly related
to the concept of the exclusive economic zone, which may be regarded as part of modern
international law, Tunisia has not chosen to base its claims upon that concept." Id.
163. It is well known that not all legal writers are in agreement over the question of
the coastal state's rights to sedentary fisheries being in fact sovereign rights over the seabed. According to the Libyan Counter-Memorial, supra note 2, at 45, "there seemed to be
general agreement that, whether or not ownership of the sea-bed was possible, the
phenomenon of sedentary fisheries and rights thereto had nothing to do with sovereignty
over the sea-bed." In the same sense see, e.g., F. DURANTE. supra note 135, at 27-29. On the
other hand, according to Judge Jimenez de Arechaga's separate opinion,
the relevance of historic rights with respect to sponge fisheries is decisive in this
particular case, when account is taken of the fact that the taking of sponges adhere-
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"historic rights" previously acquired. 164 If this view is correct, it
follows that, in so far as the area of "historic rights" claimed by
a coastal state over the sea-bed might overlap with the area of the
continental shelf appertaining to a neighboring state, these
"historical rights" might only survive if it were proved that they
have in fact continued to be exercised with the acquiescence of the
state concerned after the establishment of the customary rules on
the continental shelf.165 Such does not seem to be the case with
regard to the area of the continental shelf over which Tunisia claims
ing to the sea-bed constitutes a form of exploitation of one of the natural resources
of the shelf, according to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Continental Shelf
Convention- a provision which the Court found in 1969 to be part of customary
international law. Consequently, the taking of sponges in the area was really an
exploitation of shelf resources ... long antedating the Truman proclamation."
Continental Shelf, supra note 2, at 122 (Opinion of Jimenez de Arechaga). An evaluation
of this question would go beyond the scope of our investigation.
164. D.P. O'CONNELL, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 713 (1984). O'Connell added
that,
this view appears to have been conceded by Tunisia in the Continental Shelf Case
when it argued that any delimitation should not encroach upon its historic rights
with respect to fisheries and sponges. It based this argument not on the historic
rights themselves, but on its straight baseline system enclosing the Gulfs of Tunis
and Gabes; since the seabed of neither the territorial sea nor internal waters is
legally continental shelf, Tunisia argued that these areas should be excluded from
consideration in any calculations of proportionality. The Court rejected this argument, without making any finding as to the validity or opposability to Libya of
Tunisia's baselines.
Id. This author finds it hard to agree with this interpretation of Tunisia's position. It is
undoubtedly true that Tunisia relied on her "historic rights" as a justification for the baselines
adopted in 1973 and that she claimed that the areas between these baselines and the lowwater mark should be excluded from the proportionality calculations. However, it is no less
true that Tunisia also claimed that her "historic rights" would be per se sufficient to exclude
any claim on the part of Libya over the area subject to them. The Court examined both
these arguments. See Continental Shelf, supra note 3, 75.
165. According to the separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Jimenez de Arechage, ·.·a new
legal concept, consisting in the notion introduced in 1958 that continental shelf rights are
inherent or 'ab initio,' cannot by itself have the effect of abolishing or denying acquired
and existing rights. That would be contrary to elementary legal notions and to basic principles of intertemporal law." Id. at 123-24. It is respectfully submitted that if, from a general
point of view, it is true that the "basic principles of intertemporal law" require that no retroactive application should be given to any legal norm, it is none the less true, as J.T. Woodhouse
pointed out, that "though a law cannot change past facts it can alter the rules applicable
to those facts. Moreover, a law can go further and (as it were by a fiction) declare that these
rules are changed as from some date in the past, i.e., those responsible for the law governing past events and to pretend or assume that other rules governed." Woodhouse, The Principle of Retroactivity in International Law, 41 GROTIUS TRANSACTIONS 78 (1955). If, therefore,
O'Connell's view is accepted that the customary rules on the continental shelf are deliberately
aimed against the survival of previously acquired rights, in so far as they encroach upon
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"historic rights," since the International Court of Justice has found
that the lateral delimitation unilaterally effected by Tunisia is not
opposable to Libya. 166
With regard to the exclusive economic zone, it should be
stressed that Tunisia's "historic rights" only related to protection
and control over sponge and octopus fisheries. Whereas the
exclusive economic zone, as defined by the 1982 Montego Bay Convention, is an area of sea over which the coastal state has sovereign
rights for the purpose, inter alia, of exploring and exploiting all
the natural resources of the sea and the sea-bed. 167 It seems,
therefore, that Tunisia could not unilaterally claim the whole area
over which her "historic rights" extended as part of her exclusive
economic zone. Thus, a much more relevant factor than the old
"historic rights" over sedentary fisheries might be the "exclusive
fishery zones" proclaimed by Tunisia in 1951, insofar as it is in fact
opposable to the interested states. uss
It cannot be denied, of course, that Tunisia's "historic rights"
could operate as an important factor when negotiating delimitation
agreements with the interested states. This does not, however,
necessarily mean that the delimitation should not in any case
encroach upon the area over which the "historic rights" extended.
This paper does not purport to discuss the way in which "historic
rights" might operate as a "special circumstance" to be taken into
account in negotiating agreements to delimit the continental shelf
or exclusive economic zone. 169 In fact, it has been persuasively held
that, since the delimitation must be effected by agreement, it would
be pointless to discuss from a strictly legal point of view how the
interested states should act and what circumstances they should
take into account in reaching that "equitable solution" referred to
in Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 Montego Bay Conventions. Once
an agreement has been reached, it would be valid despite the circumstances considered by the parties and whether or not the solua shelf are a appertaining to a neighboring state, it would follow that those rights could
only be reacquired through the acquiescence of the state affected. The situation is not very
different to that described by Y.Z. BLUM, supra note 5, at 242-30, with regard to the emergence
of the customary rule on the freedom of the high seas.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 115-135.
167. 1982 Convention, supra note 12, art. 56.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 136-151.
169. On "special circumstances" for the delimitation of the continental shelf and E.E.Z.
see, e.g., D.P. O'CONNELL. supra note 164, at 705.
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tion arrived at was equitable, since there are no rules of jus cogens
on the delimitation of the continental shelf or exclusive economic
zone. 110 If this view is accepted, it follows that, rather than discussing
the possible relevance of any "historic rights" in reaching a delimitation agreement, it is much more useful to enquire into the situation as between the interested states in the absence of such an
agreement. This is in fact what has been attempted in the foregoing discussion with specific reference to Tunisia's claims to "historic
rights" and, more generally, to her claims to sovereign rights over
areas of sea or of sea-bed beyond her territorial sea.

IV. CONCLUSION
This investigation has been divided into two parts. The first
dealt with Tunisia's claims of full sovereignty over waters adjacent
to her coasts, and the second dealt with Tunisia's claims to exclusive,
though less far-ranging, rights over bodies of water beyond her territorial sea. Wherever it appeared difficult to justify both these
types of claims in light of existing rules of international law, an
attempt has been made to ascertain whether these claims can be
based on the doctrine of "historic rights."
As for Tunisia's claims of full sovereignty over adjacent sea
areas, Tunisian Law No. 73-49 (1973) has adopted a twelve-mile territorial sea, whereas the baselines from which the territorial sea
is to be measured have been chosen by adopting a combination of
the traditional low-water mark and the straight baseline methods.
In particular, straight baselines have been drawn around the shoals
fringing the Kerkennah Islands and across the Gulfs of Tunis and
Gabes. It has been found, in the first place, that there is no need
to appeal to the doctrine of "historic rights" in order to justify
Tunisia's decision to adopt a twelve-mile territorial sea since the
twelve-mile limit for the territorial sea seems by now to be part
of existing customary international law. The same conclusion has
been reached with regard to Tunisia's decision to close the Gulf
of Tunis: the closing line of the Gulf seems in fact to conform with
the international rules on "juridical" bays, at least if the islands
of Plane and Zembra, which are about twenty-three miles apart,
are taken as its "natural entrance points."

170. B.

CONJo'ORTI,

supra note 107, at 9-10.
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The closure of the Gulf of Gabes has raised more difficult
problems. Tunisia's decision cannot, in fact, .be based on the international rules on "juridical" bays, since the closing line of the Gulf
far exceeds the twenty-four mile limit established by customary
international law. Neither can the Gulf be qualified as an "historic
bay," since the claim of full sovereignty over its waters was only
advanced by Tunisia in 1973. Tunisia's "historic rights," on the other
hand, only related to surveillance and control over sedentary
fisheries.
Finally, as far as the lines drawn around the Kerkennah Islands
are concerned, it has been found that their conformity to the general
rules on the straight baseline system is, to say the least, controversial. However, it has been submitted that their validity could be
established both with reference to Article 4(4) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention, which allows for the drawing of "particular" baselines,
and by appealing to the doctrine of "historic waters." The peculiar
natural and historical characteristics of the region concerned make
it possible to regard Tunisia's "historic rights" over sedentary
fisheries as indicative of a right of full sovereignty.
With regard to Tunisia's claims to exclusive rights not amounting to full sovereignty over water areas beyond her territorial sea,
the international validity of the "exclusive fishery zone" unilaterally
proclaimed by Tunisia in 1951 has been discussed. Within the zone,
which has been delimited by adopting the fifty-metre isobath, only
vessels flying the Tunisian flag are allowed to fish. Although the
creation of the "exclusive fishery zone" should be regarded as part
of the process which culminated in the affirmation of the exclusive
economic zone by the 1982 Montego Bay Convention, it has been
thought necessary to ascertain whether the validity of this zone
can at present be established on the basis of an "historic title" and,
in any case, to analyze the attitude of other states concerned about
Tunisia's claim.
The conclusion has been reached that the creation of the
"exclusive fishery zone" could not be based on the mere strength
of the "historic rights" previously acquired by Tunisia over sedentary fisheries. On the one hand, those "historic rights" did not
include the exclusiori of foreigners; on the other, they only related
to sponge and octopus fisheries, whereas the "exclusive fishery
zone" purports to exclude foreigners from the exploitation of all
biological resources of the sea. As for the attitude of third states
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after 1951, it would be difficult to speak of general acquiescence
in Tunisia's claim, since the creation of the "exclusive fishery zone"
has been vigorously opposed by Libya as well as other states concerned that have adopted a rather cautious attitude.
Finally, some brief comments have been made on the relationship between "historic rights" over sedentary fisheries and Tunisia's
claims relating to the delimitation of her continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone. It has been submitted that, in the absence
of delimitation agreements with the other states concerned, Tunisia
could not appeal to her "historic rights" over sponge and octopus
fisheries in order to claim exclusive authority over areas of continental shelf or exclusive economic zone which are in dispute.
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